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CHAPTER I
Introduction
Most of the military engagements of the developed countries since the end of the
Cold War have been asymmetric wars.1 Table 1.1 provides a list of the military
engagements by the United States since the end of the Cold War. These conflicts
are characterized by a considerable imbalance of power between the two sides, such
that if the strong side were committed to the war effort, they would have virtually
assured victory. The issues that are at stake in these wars are often not issues of
great national interest to the strong side. If these wars are not won by the strong
side, they usually end because of a withdrawal rather than a military defeat. Since
core national interests of the strong side are not at stake in asymmetric wars, whether
to fight these wars or not, how to fight them, and when to withdraw, are more subject
to domestic politics than in other types of war.
Political calculations about what the electorate is going to think at difference
stages and different contingencies is an essential part of planning for asymmetric
wars. As a prominent recent example, it is instructive to see how the planning for
the 2003 invasion of Iraq seems to have been more influenced by political calculations
(and miscalculations) than by objective military assessments. Testifying before the
Senate Armed Services Committee on February 25, 2003, General Shinseki—Chief
of Staff of the US Army at the time—estimated that “something on the order of
several hundred thousand soldiers” would be required; in the first phase of the war,
1. The concept of asymmetric war is defined in Chapter II.
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Table 1.1: List of US military engagements since 1990.
Conflict Years
Persian Gulf War 1990-1991
Somalia: Operation Restore Hope 1992-1994
Bosnian War 1993-1995
Haiti: Operation Uphold Democracy 1994-1995
Kosovo War 1998-1999
War in Afghanistan 2001-2014?
Iraq War 2003-2011
Intervention in Libya 2011-2011
Intervention in Iraq 2014-?
the United States sent 148,000 troops (Shanker, 2007, January 12). Similarly, the
United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) had a rough estimate that the
engagement would last for ten years, while the war was being “predicted” to be short
(Gordon and Trainor 2006, page 30). It is difficult to know for certain why the Bush
administration decided to go to war the way it did, but a plausible candidate is that
they thought they could outperform the gloomy predictions that prescribed restraint
in the use of force.2 Berger and Borer (2007) write “the Pentagon, in their view,
seemed to be more concerned with persuading the US electorate that invading Iraq
would not lead to a Vietnam-style quagmire than it was with the vagaries of post-war
nation building.”
Despite the scholarly interest in the study of asymmetric wars, we lack clear un-
derstanding potential limitations imposed by domestic politics on the way asymmetric
wars are fought. These limitations have led some scholars to posit that democracies
underperform in asymmetric wars, but the causal mechanisms behind this underper-
formance are quite opaque and this prohibits us from answering important questions.
2. The Powell Doctrine is a notable example of recommendations for restraint in the use of force.
It asserts, inter alia, that the United States should only use military force when it must, and if
forces are to be used, overwhelming force should be used. This doctrine, articulated by General
Collin Powell in the lead-up to the Persian Gulf War in 1990, was informed by the history American
military involvements after WWII.
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When does the strong side withdraw from the war? Why does public opinion shift
the way it does, starting up, going down, and stagnating? And why strong states do
not do more to guarantee their victory?
These questions affect how wars are fought and wrong answers can lead to disas-
trous outcomes as alluded to in the case of the Iraq war. The lack of causal mecha-
nisms and the contradictions in the observed correlations have led to obstinate con-
ventional wisdoms—like the idea that public opinion is driven by aggregate casualties.
Similarly, attributing the unfavorable outcomes of past wars to minor tactical or even
strategic mistakes that can be rectified in the next war, instead of understanding the
inescapable forces that have to be taken into account when powerful states go to war
for marginal reasons, sets the stage for the next war.3
This dissertation is a three part project that examines the link between domestic
politics and asymmetric wars from two different angles: how long the strong side
continues fighting and how war is supplied. The goal is to study the limitations
that domestic politics may impose on the capabilities of democratic states for fight-
ing asymmetric wars. The theories developed here are rooted in the preferences of
individual citizens, but provide predictions at the macro level as well.
Chapter II: Rationally Impatient Citizens
Formal models of conflict have provided much insight about conventional wars.
But the existing studies are not very helpful in understanding the dynamics of asym-
metric wars because they either focus on two-player games, modeling the two adver-
saries as unitary actors or they model war as a game-ending move. Both of these
assumptions are problematic in asymmetric wars. The first assumption is problem-
atic because these wars are subject to the vagaries of domestic politics—much more
so than conventional wars—and assuming the two sides to be unitary actors may
3. In both Britain and the United States, it was public opinion that prevented a military attack
on Syria in the summer of 2013 after the Syrian government was accused of using chemical weapons.
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severely limit our understanding of when wars are fought; the second assumption is
problematic because these wars often turn into protracted wars, and a one-shot model
of war does not provide any insight about how the wars end. In this study, I build a
modified war of attrition model that relaxes both of these assumptions.
The model that I present has three players (the weak side, the leader of the strong
side, and the citizenry of the strong side); and the war is a process, not a game-ending
move. The model allows us to study how citizens learn about the war and to examine
the dynamics of their aggregate opinion from a rationalist perspective. An extension
of the model adds a multitude of citizens in order to study the changes of aggregate
public opinion.
This model provides a number of behavioral and institutional predictions. The
more important results are the following. As time elapses, citizens learn about the
expected remaining duration of the war, which produces a downward trend in public
support for the war. Duration is found to have a causal effect on citizens’ opinions:
citizens are rationally impatient about asymmetric wars. Interestingly, there are citi-
zens whose opinion will never change. Finally, compared to autocracies, democracies
are expected to fight shorter asymmetric wars.
Chapter III: Keep Fighting or Quit
This part is a collection of empirical studies designed to test the hypotheses drawn
from my formal model in Chapter II. I use an existing data set of counter-insurgency
wars to test the institutional hypotheses. I show that more democratic states fight
shorter counter-insurgency wars, when the war happens outside their territory. When
counter-insurgency wars are against domestic insurgents, however, there is no ob-
served difference between democratic and non-democratic countries in terms of how
long they continue their fight.
For behavioral hypotheses, individual level data are used, which are from survey
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experiments that I have administered. I show that even when we keep the total
casualties constant, an increase in the duration of war can lead to lower levels of
support for war. This is in line with my theoretical prediction and in direct contrast
to what theories based on aggregate casualties predict (which is no effect for duration)
or theories based on the intensity of casualties predict (which is a positive effect for
duration).
Chapter IV: A Two-Tax Model of War Supply
Part of the debate about whether democracies are disadvantaged in fighting asym-
metric wars is the puzzle of why strong militaries perform poorly in asymmetric wars.
Some scholars have argued that modern armies are disadvantaged in fighting asym-
metric wars because they are heavily mechanized and are designed to fight conven-
tional wars. Various explanations are put forward in the literature for why modern
armies fail to choose the best strategies in fighting small wars, but these explana-
tions often involve assumptions that require the state to be unable to learn from past
mistakes.
I use a standard bargaining model of war with the novel feature that war supply
is endogenous and two-dimensional. That is, two elements go into making an army:
capital and labor. Both elements are collected as taxes on the population: capital is
supplied by income taxes; manpower is supplied by a draft. A modified Cobb-Douglas
production function translates these elements into military power, which determines
the likelihood of victory for each side. I assume that the society has two strata: the
elite, who have higher incomes and can avoid being drafted, but are nevertheless
sensitive to casualties; and the masses. I study how, in equilibrium, the masses (in
democracies) or the elite (in autocracies) decide how to allocate resources for war.
This model leads to a number of important comparative static predictions. In
asymmetric wars, it is predicted that democracies always allocate more capital and
5
fewer soldiers than autocracies. As the adversary becomes more likely to rely on guer-
rilla warfare, both democracies and autocracies are weakened, but the effect is larger
for democracies. This contributes to the debate in the literature by showing that
democracies are not necessarily worse than their autocratic counterparts in an abso-
lute sense. All types of modern states perform worse when they fight guerrilla wars,
but democracies underperform more more strongly (compared to when they fight
conventional wars). This underperformance is affected by the income gap between
the two strata of the society. Higher gaps lead to more capital-intensive militaries in
democracies, but lead to less capital-intensive militaries in autocracies. This means
that as the income gap grows, the underperformance is worsened in democracies but
improved in autocracies.
I also study the bargaining phase of the model to see, on the one hand, the
difference between democracies and autocracies, and, on the other hand, the difference
between the position of the elite and the masses as various parameters of the model
change. In democracies, the masses may be more or less hawkish than the elite, but
in autocracies, the masses are almost always more generous and less risk-taking than
the elite.
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CHAPTER II
Rationally Impatient Citizens
2.1 Introduction
Most of the military engagements of the United States and other developed coun-
tries since the end of the Cold War have been asymmetric wars. These wars are
characterized by a stark imbalance of power between the two sides and by the fact
that the issues at stake are not issues of highest national priority to the strong side.
In asymmetric wars, military superiority does not automatically translate into victory
as strong states have frequently failed to win these wars.1 Public opinion is usually
in support of these wars but the support diminishes over time. How long can the
strong keep fighting these wars? Despite the enormous importance of the asymmetric
wars, the existing literature does not provide clear causal mechanisms that would
allow us to answer questions like how long a strong state can keep fighting these wars
before they have to stop. This chapter is a first attempt in modeling domestic poli-
tics of asymmetric wars from a rationalist perspective. The model provides a number
of testable hypotheses about the difference between democratic and nondemocratic
states, as well as on public opinion dynamics during asymmetric wars.
While there is a general agreement among scholars about the declining public
1. This is a common observation that has been attributed to a variety of reasons including inef-
ficient military strategies, norms that limit the behavior of armed forces of democratic states, and
domestic politics in democratic states. See Mack (1975), Arreguin-Toft (2001), and Merom (2003).
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support for asymmetric wars, we do not have a good understanding of the underlying
causal mechanisms of wartime public opinion dynamics (Gartner 2008). Scholars of
public opinion have considered four broad categories of factors that affect citizens’
opinion about war: primary objectives of wars (Jentleson and Britton 1998); indi-
vidual predispositions (Federico, Golec, and Dial 2005); elite cues (Berinsky 2009);
and direct observation of costs by citizens (Mueller 1973). The first two categories,
respectively, explain differences between support for different wars, and different lev-
els of support among citizens with regard to a single war. The latter two categories,
elite cue and cost-based argument, are used to explain dynamics of public opinion as
a war progresses.
Despite the extent of public opinion research over the past decades, two major
problems have yet to be addressed and formalization is one way to address both of
these problems. First, there are many competing explanations for why public opinion
declines and the empirical literature has not been able to adjudicate among them.
Formal models may help us better understand the core causal mechanisms underlying
these explanations. Second, there are two strategic components to the story: strategic
interaction on the domestic scene between politicians and citizens, as well as on the
international scene between adversaries. Each of these strategic components creates
situations where players might have incentives to misrepresent their intentions, but,
despite assumptions of “rationality” or “somewhat rationality” of the citizenry, neither
of these strategic elements play a role in the received theories. In reality, there are
strong indications that some strategic calculations enter—or perhaps, trickle down
to—the public discourse about war. A prominent example is the discourse in Amer-
ican politics about setting a timetable for the Iraq war, where those supporting the
continuation of the war argued that setting a deadline would be tantamount to ac-
cepting defeat.2 If the public can distinguish a fight against a rational adversary from
2. Throughout the paper, the Iraq war refers to the American military involvement in Iraq from
2003 to 2011. As an example of the debates about setting a timetable in Iraq, see The Washington
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a struggle against nature, not accounting for this distinction in our theories can result
in what Tsebelis has called the Robinson Crusoe fallacy (Tsebelis 1989).
The existing formal models of conflict have provided much insight into the causes
of initiation and continuation of interstate and civil wars. Most of the intellectual
effort, however, has been in modeling classical warfare, which is often studied as
a war between two unitary actors who may resort to war as a game-ending move
(Powell 2002). With the exception of specific topics like audience cost theory that
rely on some specification of domestic politics, the citizenry is completely absent
in models of conflict (A. Smith 1998; Schultz 1998). Similarly, most models do not
study the dynamics of war, although prominent exceptions are Fearon’s study of crisis
escalation, and works that consider war as a process rather than a terminal move.3
Because there is either no citizenry or no war process, the fundamental question of
how a rational citizenry would act in war cannot be answered using the existing
models. Likewise, given the pronounced effect of domestic politics in asymmetric
wars, it is not clear how much of the results of these models hold in asymmetric wars.
I start with a canonical model of war and let the periods of fighting shrink. The
model becomes similar to models of war of attrition in continuous time but is different
from the classical war of attrition in a few critical ways (Maynard Smith 1974). Most
importantly, the war can end in two ways: the usual way, when one side concedes
to the other side; or as the result of an exogenous event, which may happen at any
time and end the conflict in a stochastically determined outcome. In addition, on the
strong side, the public is explicitly present in the model as a player, so there are three
players.
In this model, the strong side’s costs are assumed to be public knowledge, but
the weak’s costs are not. One of the results is that this asymmetry of information
Post, 12 April 2007, A1.
3. See Fearon (1994) for a prominent adaptation of the war of attrition model; for works that
study war as a process rather than a single stage see Wagner (2000), Smith and Stam (2003), and
Powell (2004, 2013).
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acts like a lever: a non-zero chance that the weak side is a hothead is enough to
force the strong side to effectively have a deadline. If the war is not decided on the
battleground, the strong side quits when that deadline is reached. I show that under
a broad set of assumptions and so long as the value of victory for the strong side is
lower than a threshold, public support for war will decline over time as the public
learns about the expected duration of the war. Notably, this pattern is what we can
expect even from a purely informational point of view. It is what we will see even with
a fixed rate of casualties—regardless of whether or not citizens know fallen soldiers,
how they look at the justification for war, and even the role played by the elite as
conveyors of information. This is not to say that various mechanisms identified in the
literature are not important, or that all citizens are in reality rational actors. But
it does suggest that the main pattern observed in the empirical literature is more
inevitable than appreciated.
Leaders often lack mechanisms to credibly convey foreign policy information to
their citizens. Public opinion regarding ‘wars of choice’ is at risk of both type I and
type II errors: at the outset, the public may support wars it should not support (i.e.,
it would not support if it had perfect information), and if the war is not won within
some period, the public may withdraw support from wars that it should support (i.e.,
it would support if it had perfect information). The extent of available information
changes the length of time that the public supports a war, but if the stakes are low
enough, the preponderance of time will eventually trump any prior information and
force the public to stop supporting the war.
Holding everything constant, it is predicted that as time goes by, people’s expec-
tation of the remaining duration of war goes up and public opinion becomes less and
less supportive of war until it reaches a plateau. Also, states with more checks on
their leaders are generally expected to quit their wars faster than others.
This chapter is organized as follows: a brief review of some of the most relevant
10
quantitative works in the literature; presentation of the primary model and the basic
machinery needed to analyze it; a study of the equilibrium outcomes of the model;
discussion of comparative statics and other results obtained from the models; and
conclusions.
2.2 Public Opinion and Costs of War
Research on public opinion support for war can be divided into two by and large
complementary branches: one is mostly concerned with citizens’ limits and how the
elite influence the public, while the other is mostly concerned with how events in-
fluence public opinion. The former has its roots in the work of Walter Lippmann,
“The American Voter,” and other influential mid-century works in American politics,
whereas the latter has a pedigree in the work of scholars of international relations,
most notably John Mueller (Lippmann 1922; Campbell et al. 1960; Mueller 1973).
Notwithstanding the depth and breadth of work in each branch, the micro founda-
tions of both branches remain opaque. Here, I will briefly review some of the main
results and highlight outstanding questions that have motivated my research.
Perhaps the strongest finding in public opinion about war is the extent to which
people’s support for war correlates with their partisanship (also interacting with where
they are located on the pyramid of ideological sophistication) and the extent to which
public opinion appears to be influenced by elite discourse (Zaller 1994; Berinsky 2009).
But, since we know office seeking politicians are themselves influenced by the “latent
opinion” of their constituency, elite-based observations are not enough to conclude
that the causal arrow of opinion shift is from the elite toward citizens. Alternatively,
why do the elite sometimes support war and sometimes not? Recent research on
the decisions of members of the House of Representatives shows that the number of
casualties in representatives’ home districts influence their speeches and their roll-call
votes (Kriner and Shen 2014).
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In his pioneering work, Mueller put forth the idea that public support for war
wanes as the accumulated level of casualties rises.4 Mueller, however, provided this
as one of his empirical observations and did not say “why or how this happens or
what the consequences are” (Jennings 1974). Whereas his empirical observations have
proved robust, there has been some disagreement about how it should be interpreted.
Debates have centered on whether or not the public has a knee-jerk reaction to specific
levels of casualties, how sensitive people are to casualties, and whether the American
public is “cost-phobic” or “casualty-phobic.” (H. Smith 2005).
Recent works generally accept that citizens do not automatically respond to some
thresholds of accepted levels of cost, but, rather, do cost-benefit analysis, and their
opinion depends on the primary policy objective of war.5 Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler
(2006) have argued that citizens’ sensitivity is governed by the interaction of two
factors: how justified they think the war effort is, and their perception of the likelihood
of victory. It has also been shown that local casualties, shocks in casualty rates, and
trends of casualties also affect public opinion (Gartner, Segura, and Wilkening 1997;
Gartner and Segura 1998; Gartner 2008).
The causal chain that connects costs to expressions of beliefs still remains unclear
and subject of academic debates (Berinsky and Druckman 2007; Gelpi and Reifler
2008). Moreover, even the most widely accepted elements of the common wisdom
have been challenged: while the recent war in Iraq was happening, Berinsky found
that correcting citizens’ beliefs about the number of American casualties did not
change their support for the war (Berinsky 2007). Nevertheless, casualties are still
considered the most important source of information. For example, in reviewing Gelpi
et al.’s work, Gartner (2010) writes that it “remains unclear how the American public
4. Studying the Korean and the Vietnam wars, Mueller found that public support diminished by
15% for every 10-fold increase in total casualties.
5. Jentleson (1992) and Jentleson and Britton (1998) make the case that public support for war
depends on primary policy objectives of the war. For studies on how the American public performs
cost-benefit analysis in various wars see Larson and Savych (2005).
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updates their views on success independent from casualties. Given well-known limits
on the public’s foreign policy knowledge, what stream of wartime information (other
than casualties) generates changes in peoples’ perceptions of the probability of success
sufficient to explain observed variations in public opinion?” In the following section,
I will argue that observed duration of a conflict is such a signal, observed at low cost
and available to the public without much possibility of manipulation by the elite.
2.3 A War of Attrition with Exogenous Termination
The war of attrition model is an appealing candidate for modeling the dynamics of
asymmetric wars. In terms of the strategy, these wars do not resemble classical warfare
and in terms of stakes, these are wars about issues that are existential to the weak side
and of marginal importance to the strong side. The critical link between these wars
and the war of attrition is that the winner is the one who outlasts the other. But as
Agastya and McAfee (2006) have argued, there are a number of mismatches between
empirical observations about wars and the theoretical results of wars of attrition.
Most relevant to this work is the problem of immediate cessation of hostilities which
the typical solution from the classical war of attrition models, which cannot explain
why, in asymmetric wars, the weaker side keeps fighting.
Here, I use a canonical model of war in the conflict literature. Two sides are
engaged in a multi-period war. In each period, they fight if both sides decide to
fight. Each period of war can be decisive or not. If decisive, the war ends with a
stochastically determined outcome. If not, it is again up to the adversaries whether
they wish to continue the fight or to quit. Figure 2.1 shows one period of this war.
Each period of fighting takes ∆t units of time. Throughout the paper, I will assume
that ∆t is infinitesimally small, so we are using continuous time—similar to the war
of attrition model. Also similar to other models of war of attrition, issue indivisibility
is the reason for the possibility of war between rational actors (Fearon 1995). Unlike
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other model of war of attrition, war is not just a staring contest here; actual fighting
is assumed between the two sides.
I will assume that the benefits of war and the likelihood of victory for each side
are public knowledge and fixed so that we can focus on how players learn about costs.
It is not clear how one should model costs. If the stage-game in Figure 2.1 is repeated
until one side wins—that is, no one drops out—the expected cost is E[cost] = c
1−ρ
which shows that the cost depends on both ρ (the chance that a period of war does
not end in victory for one side) and c (the per period cost of fighting). Based on
this, I will first dissect cost into two elements, namely, intensity (per period costs)
and duration, and show that if we assume that these are both fixed, learning about
expected duration is much more difficult than learning about expected intensity. Then
I will present the modified war of attrition model that is informed by this insight.
Duration and Intensity
We want to study the difference between learning about the rate of accumulation of
casualties and learning about the expected duration of conflict. I ask two questions.
First, what is the difference between the speed of learning about the intensity of
accumulation of costs and the speed of learning about the duration of a process?
Second, ex ante, what is the difference between the amount of information that is
expected to be learnt throughout a process when the unknown factor is the intensity
of accumulation of costs and when the unknown factor is the expected duration of
the process.
We assume a war between two adversaries and focus on the available information
from the point of view of one of the adversaries. Assume that the war starts at
time t = 0 and the event of the end of war is exponentially distributed with rate λ.
Furthermore, assume that casualties are also generated by a homogeneous Poisson
14
war
. . . war
ρ
1− ρ
con
tinu
es
ends
victory
defeat
pi
1− pi
∆t
Figure 2.1: One period of fighting from the perspective of one of the players.
process with a rate of µ so the mean of total casualties at time t is µt.6
To compare how one learns about duration (λ) and intensity (µ) let us consider
two scenarios: In the first scenario, everything is known except µ, which can either be
µ1 or µ2 = αµ1. In the second scenario, everything is known except λ which can either
be λ1 or λ2 = αλ1. For simplicity, assume that both events are equally likely (under
both scenarios), so that initially there is exactly 1 bit of ambiguity (h = − log2 12 = 1).
Using Bayes’ rule, posterior probabilities are derived in Appendix II.A. A numeri-
cal example is sufficient here to demonstrate the difference between the two scenarios.
Assume the unit of time is month and α = 3, µ1 = 5 (average casualty per month
in the low-cost war), and λ1 = 112 (average expected length for the long war is one
year). Posterior probabilities under the two scenarios are drawn in Figure 2.2. In
this example, after three months, given almost any observed level of casualties, an
observer is able to form an accurate opinion about the intensity, whereas learning
about duration happens much more slowly.
The above comparison informs us about the learning process as the war progresses.
Now let us consider the second question: before a war happens, how informative about
6. Note that in models that assume a fixed per period random costs and probability that the war
ends in each period, the exponential distribution of duration and the Poisson process for casualties
arise naturally as the duration of each period shrinks to zero, i.e., ∆t→ 0.
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Figure 2.2: Comparing uncertainty about cost and uncertainty about length of war. The
expected cost is either 5 or 15 soldiers/month (left) and the expected duration is either 4 or
12 months(right). The left figure is drawn for t = 3 months. The dashed vertical lines mark
the expected value of the casualties (left) and duration (right).
the unknown parameter is the realization of the war expected to be? Shannon’s
information measure for each scenario is derived in Appendix II.A (Shannon 1948).
Here, we can again rely on a numerical example to demonstrate the vast differ-
ence between the two scenarios. Continuing with the previous example and further
assuming λ = 1
4
for the first scenario, we have I1 = 0.97975 bits and I2 = 0.47492
bits. That is to say, in expectation, total casualties will contain almost all of the
information about the type of war, whereas the duration of the war (even when the
observer waits until a war ends) contains less than half of the information one needs
to know the type of the conflict.
There is nothing special about the above numerical example. In the first scenario,
casualties provide a constant stream of information about the type of war. This
stream is probabilistic, but a very short period of time is enough to allow a very
accurate estimate of the unknown random variable. In the second scenario, the only
piece of information available at any time is whether the war is still continuing or
not. Unless the war continues for a very long time (see Figure 2.2), one cannot infer
the type of war with much confidence.
Finally, it is important to note that even a continuous distribution of types of
war, as opposed to a high type and a low type as assumed here, essentially yields
16
the same conclusion. To see this, assume that whatever information one may be
able to obtain by observing the war is going to be used to make a judgement about
whether the war should be stopped or not. The binary decision forces a partition
over the domain of the unknown variable, which makes it comparable to the setting
studied here. In other words, when the problem can be reduced to an evaluation of a
dichotomous random variable, i.e., whether or not the war is a war worth fighting, the
above analysis requires little modification and yields a similar result: learning about
expected duration (or its inverse, the hazard rate) is more difficult than learning about
intensity. This result, at a minimum, motivates us to pay attention to duration as a
possibly important factor in determining how people evaluate whether a war is worth
fighting or not.
The setup
Two states are involved in an international crisis: a strong state (A), and a weak
state (B). If they go to war and neither side quits, it is common knowledge that A
will eventually win with probability pi and lose with probability 1 − pi, but it is not
known how long the war might last. The war can either be a short war, which ends
with a constant hazard rate Λ, or a long war, which ends with a constant hazard rate
λ. This implies Λ > λ. The model has three players: the leader on side A (L, for
leader), the public on side A (M, for the median voter who is representing the public),
and a unitary actor on side B (B). The common prior about the war being short is
p0, and pi is used to distinguish between the beliefs of different players at different
times, where i ∈ {B,L,M}.
The timing of the events is as follows. At the start, nature decides the hazard
rate of the war. Then L and B receive a shared noisy binary signal about whether
the war is short (denoted by S) or the war is long (denoted by L). I shall refer to this
signal as the international signal and assume that it matches the true state of the
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world with probability 1 − , where  ∈ (0, 1
2
). M does not observe the international
signal.
At t = −1, L sends a binary message to M, which I call the domestic signal. This
may inform M of the value of the received international signal. Then, starting at
t = 0, L and B simultaneously decide whether to fight or not. If one side concedes,
the prize (with a value of v) goes to the other side.
If the war is initiated, it starts at time t = 0 and is fought in continuous time
until either one side withdraws from the war conceding the prize to the other side,
or when the war comes to a natural conclusion, which results in the winner getting
the contested prize. At any time during the war, each of L and B have two actions
available to them, which I call ‘fight’ and ‘quit.’ For completeness, I assume that if
both sides simultaneously withdraw (or neither side play fight at their first chance at
t = 0), the prize is divided such that both L and B get v/2; this assumption does not
affect the results.
I assume that M has two actions available during any war: supporting the war or
not supporting the war. M’s action only changes L’s cost of fighting. Differences in
domestic institutions only affect how much L’s cost depends on M’s approval of the
war. For uniformity of discussions, M’s available actions during war are referred to
as ‘fight’ and ‘quit’ where fighting means supporting the war and quitting means not
supporting the war.
Players have per unit costs of fighting, which are cL, cB and cM for L, B and M
respectively. cB and cM are assumed to be constant but cL(t) = c` + α m(t), where
m(t) = 0 if M supports the war and m(t) = 1 if M does not support the war. It is
assumed that c` < c` + α < cM , so that L’s cost of fighting is lower when she has
public support for war, but even without public support, her cost is lower than M’s
cost.
B is assumed to observe the domestic scene in State A. B’s own cost, cB ∈ R+,
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is private knowledge; L and M only know the cumulative density function FcB . I
assume that FcB is continuous and differentiable with fcB being the probability density
function of cB. Finally, I assume that players have a common exponential discount
factor r > 1.7
Some Preliminaries
A strategy profile in this game should assign an action to each player at every
history of the game in which that player plays. Given that there is a continuum
of information sets, the equilibrium concepts most often used in extended games
of imperfect information require some modification. Throughout the paper, I use a
refinement of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept suitable for the current model.
In addition to the two conditions of sequential rationality and consistency of beliefs,
it is required that players’ strategies during war be such that if a player’s strategy is
to ‘quit’ at time t >= 0, that player’s strategy be to quit at any subsequent time.8
This refinement is a arguably a less stringent condition than stationarity, which is
typically used to limit the set of equilibria in simple timing games (Fudenberg and
Tirole 1991). The refinement is discussed in detail in Appendix II.B.
One of the benefits of the refined equilibrium concept is that it allows a pithy
description of the strategies: instead of a complete mapping from every t ≥ 0 to
{fight, quit}, we only need to specify the first time each player plays ‘quit’—which
may be never, denoted by +∞. This means that strategies can be be simply shown
as ti = min{t|i plays ‘quit’ at t}.9
7. Allowing discount factors to be different does not change any of the substantive results, at
the cost of more complication in the notations, and therefore seems unnecessary unless we want to
obtain comparative statics with respect to discount factors.
8. I am following Fearon (1994) in calling this a refinement of the Bayesian equilibrium concept.
Equivalently, one might consider this constraint a limit on the set of possible strategies of the game,
not a refinement of the equilibrium concept. The results, of course, do not depend on the term used
here.
9. Here, min{t} is used with the assumption that the strategy is right-continuous, so that there
exists a smallest quitting time in the strategy; we can use the same notation for left-continuous
strategies as well, by replacing minimum with infimum and showing a + superscript on the quitting
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For B and for M, any possible strategy is completely described by tM and tB,
which conditioned on their assessment of other parameters, determines when they
quit for the first time. For L, we need to specify the domestic signal that L sends at
t = −1, and also because it is possible for L to fight a war without public support, L’s
strategy could depend on whether or not there is public support for fighting, and, in
principle, on when public support is lost. Notice without public support, L’s payoff
is independent of the timing of losing public support. I.e., if at time t2 war is not
supported by M, it would not make any difference for L how far in the past M has
quit. This implies that if there is a dominant strategy for L, it should not depend on
the timing of losing support. I will use letters PS and NPS as subscripts indicate L’s
strategies with and without public support for war.10
We can now discuss how the beliefs are updated. Consider B and L’s belief after
receiving their signal. If the signal is S, their beliefs about the true length of the war
is
pi
i∈{L,B}
(0|S) = p0(1− )
p0(1− ) + (1− p0) > p0 (2.1)
and similarly if they receive a long signal, pi(0|L) = p0p0+(1−p0)(1−) < p0 . So L and
B know more about the world than the public knows. At t = −1 when L sends her
domestic signal to M, M may learn the value of the international signal, in which case
her belief about the state of the world is like L’s, or M may learn nothing, in which
case her belief remains the same as the common prior p0.
If a war is started, all players obtain additional information about the expected
length of the war as time goes by. Using Bayes’ rule, when the war reaches any time
time, like tB = 5+ which means B’s strategy is to fight if t ≤ 5 and to quit otherwise.
10. In theory, L’s strategy can depend on when M quits not just whether or not M has quit, but
because of payoff equivalence for L, this only leads to a proliferation of pathological strategies with
no substantive importance. For example, we could have an equilibrium where if M quits before some
time t < 1, L must quit at any time t > 2, but if M quits at 1 ≤ 1 ≤ 2, L should quit at t ≥ 2 :
the only difference is what happens at time t = 2, because at that point L is indifferent between
quitting and fighting for exactly one moment. I eschew such pathologies by assuming that strategies
are right-continuous.
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t, each player’s belief about the likelihood of the rate of the exogenous event being Λ
is
pi(t) = Pi(short war|war has reached time t) = pi(0)
pi(0) + (1− pi(0))et(Λ−λ) . (2.2)
Notice that (2.2) shows that regardless of the initial belief, players use the same rule
to update their beliefs. Moreover, pi(t) is strictly decreasing in time.
Let t∗i be the optimal quitting time from player i’s perspective if i knew that the
other side will never quit. At t∗i , assuming that the other side is never quitting, i
would not prefer continuation of the war to a concession. Since the belief in the war
being short is strictly decreasing, it suffices to find the time when i’s marginal cost
and reward match for the first (and only) time. So we should solve piv
(
(pi(t
∗
i )Λ +
(1 − pi(t∗i ))λ
)
= ci, where pi is obtained from (2.2) and ci is i’s cost After some
algebra we obtain t∗i (ci) = log
(
− pi(0)(piivΛ−ci)
(1−pi(0))(piivλ−ci)
)
/(Λ − λ) where the time index of
ci is suppressed and pii is used to mean the probability of victory for player i to
obtain a generic notation. Note that piL = piM = 1 − piB = pi. To obtain a range
of [0,+∞) for t∗, the domain should be (ci, ci], where ci = piivλ, and ci(pi(0)) =
piiv(pi(0)Λ + (1− pi(0))λ).
It is helpful to extend the definition of t∗ and make it such that it always maps to
the [0,+∞] range regardless of the cost
t∗i
(
ci, p
)
=

0 ci > ci
log
(
− p(piivΛ− ci)
(1− p)(piivλ− ci)
)
/(Λ− λ) ci ∈ (ci, ci]
+∞ ci < ci
(2.3)
The optimal time for a player in one side was obtained with the assumption that
the other side is never quitting. Now, consider when B knows that L is going to quit
at time τ .
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Observation 2.1. In any equilibrium where L quits at time τ, B cannot quit at any
time t ≥ τ .
Given that the war is bound to end at τ regardless of B’s action, B cannot find
quitting at time τ an optimal decision because it is strictly dominated by not quitting.
Furthermore, L’s strategy after time τ is always to quit, so even if L deviates at τ, her
strategy is to quit at every following history. So in no equilibrium can B’s strategy
include quitting at τ or any time after that.
Again assume L’s strategy is to quit at time τ. When is the latest time that B can
quit in an equilibrium?
Definition. Let c˜B(τ) denote the lowest cost that makes B indifferent between
never quitting and quitting at some optimal time θ, 0 ≤ θ < τ.11 To make the
notation more general, I extend the domain to include τ = 0 and define c˜B(0) = +∞.
It is shown in Appendix II.C that c˜B(τ) always exists. This quantity will appear in
the description of the equilibria of the game.
2.4 Equilibrium Outcomes
Depending on the level of costs and the institutional setting, different equilibria
exist. We begin by considering a simplified version of Γ, which we call Γw, and has
only two players, L and B. Then we study the equilibrium characteristics of the full
game.
The Model without the Median Voter
Assume that the game has only two players; citizens are completely absent. This
is when a = 0 in the autocratic setting so M’s actions are without any effect. Re-
member that cB = (1 − pi)λv, which is the threshold of cost below which fighting is
11. c˜B(τ) depends on B’s belief about the length of the war. c˜B(τ, pB(0)) is a more accurate
representation but the second argument is suppressed as there is no risk of confusion.
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always a dominant strategy for B. I assume that FcB(cB) > 0 so that the types of
B who regardless of L’s strategy prefer fighting to quitting happen with a non-zero
probability. I also assume that cL > cL = pivλ, which means if L had perfect informa-
tion, L would want to fight short wars but not long wars. The following proposition
suggests that there is essentially one equilibrium in which L may quit.
Observation 2.2. In any equilibrium of Γw in which L quits at some time tL, B’s
strategy is to quit at t∗B(cB) if cB ≥ c˜B(t∗L) and to never quit otherwise.
The proof follows from the definition and proof of existence of c˜B. If L is in
equilibrium quitting at every t ≥ tL, then B’s best response cannot be quitting if B
has fought until tL. The types of B who find quitting at some time before tL better
than waiting until tL are those for whom cB > c˜B(tA). For simplicity and without any
substantive loss, I assume that the border case of cB = c˜B(tA) also quits. Furthermore,
if B’s cost is such that B is going to quit, B must quit at t∗B obtained from (2.3).
Proposition 2.1. In any equilibrium of Γw we have
– tL = t∗L
– tB = t∗B(cB) if cB ≥ c˜B(t∗L)
– tB = +∞ if cB < c˜B(t∗L).
Proof. The proposition means that L cannot commit to fighting forever, and more
specifically, quits at an exact time. Depending on B’s cost, B’s strategy may be
quitting or fighting until L quits. Figure 2.3 illustrates this equilibrium.
I first show that the proposed strategy is an equilibrium for Γw. Then I shall
demonstrate that this is the only equilibrium in which L may quit at some time, and
that there is no equilibrium where L fights forever.
L’s cost is known, and L and B have similar priors about the length of the war.
Hence, L’s quitting time assuming that B never quits, t∗L, is known and is obtained
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Figure 2.3: The graph illustrates Proposition 2.1.
from (2.3). B cannot profitably deviate from the prescribed strategy, as shown in
Observation 2.2. If B does not quit by t∗B
(
c˜B(t
∗
L)
)
, L becomes certain that B would
never quit. This means that L also cannot profitably deviate from this equilibrium.
At the outset, L and B’s beliefs about the length of the war is obtained from
Bayes’ rule shown in (2.1) and updated over time, again using Bayes’ rule, as shown
in (2.2). L’s belief about B’s type (B’s cost) can also be updated until t∗B
(
c˜B(t
∗
L)
)
because, at every moment up to that time, a type of B is expected to drop out with
certainty. Therefore, when the war reaches time t, 0 < t ≤ t∗B
(
c˜B(t
∗
L)
)
, L’s belief
about cB is the original distribution without its tail. That is,
FˆcB(c|B has not quit before t) =
 0 c ≥ t
∗−1
B (t)
FcB(c)/FcB(t
∗−1
B (t)) c < t
∗−1
B (t)
(2.4)
where t∗−1B (t) is the inverse of t
∗(cB). This concludes the demonstration of the pro-
posed strategy profile in tandem with the stated beliefs as an equilibrium of the Γw.
To show that the proposed equilibrium is unique, notice that from the first part
of this proof, if L is quitting at t∗L, as described, B’s unique best response is what is
described. So, to have any different equilibrium in which L may quit at some time, L
must either quit at some t1 < t∗L or at some t2 > t∗L. I show that neither case can be
held in equilibrium.
First, assume that L quits at t1 < t∗L. This cannot be held, as L can always deviate
to quitting at t∗L and obtain a strictly better payoff. The reason is that, according to
Observation 2.2, by the time L reaches t1, she is certain that B is not quitting and
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therefore ought to quit at t∗L, following the definition of t∗i .
Second, assume that L quits at t2 > t∗L. B’s best response is to quit at t∗B
(
cB
)
if
cB ≥ c˜B(t2). So types of B keep dropping out until t∗B
(
c˜B(t2)
)
. There are two possible
cases. First assume t∗B
(
c˜B(t2)
) ≥ t∗L. This means that when L reaches t∗B(c˜B(t2)), L
becomes certain that B is not quitting and because t∗B
(
c˜B(t2)
) ≥ t∗L, L ought to quit
immediately, but we assumed L does not quit until t2 and we know t2 > t∗B(c˜B(t2)),
hence a contradiction. Alternatively, t∗B
(
c˜B(t2)
)
< t∗L, which again means that by the
time L reaches t∗L, she is certain B is not quitting and should quit immediately, not
waiting until t2 > t∗L.
Finally, assume that there exists an equilibrium where L’s strategy is to always
fight (i.e., tL = +∞). It follows that if cB > cB, B must quit at t∗B(cB), and if cB < cB,
B must never quit. I will show there exists a time after which L would prefer quitting
to fighting, contradicting the assumption.
L’s expected marginal utility for fighting at time t can be found as
dEUL(t, fight)
dt
= v
(
fcB
(
t∗−1B (t)
)
FcB
(
t∗−1B (t)
) ∣∣∣∣∂t∗−1B (t)∂t
∣∣∣∣+ pipL(t)Λ + pi(1− pL(t))λ
)
− cL,
which is comprised of three elements. The first term shows expected benefits from the
chance that B may quit in the near future, given that B has not quit before time t.
The rest of the equation, similar to the derivation of (2.3), shows the payoff that may
be obtained if the war ends. We have FcB(t
∗−1
B (t)) > FcB(cB) > 0, and fcB(t
∗−1
B (t))
is bounded. Also,
∣∣∣∂t∗−1B (t)∂t ∣∣∣ goes to zero as time goes to infinity. Since the rest of
the payoff is negative for t > t∗L, at some point in time L will have negative marginal
utility for continuing the fighting, which implies L’s strategy of never quitting is
strictly dominated. This contradicts the assumption of tL = +∞.
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The Full Model
In the full model, the median voter is a third player. M can approve or disapprove
the war, but cannot force the leader to stop it (cL = c` or cL = c` + α). There is
no specification of domestic institutions except α which shows how much L’s cost of
fighting is going to increase if M does not support war. We can assume that more
democratic regimes, or regimes with more constraints on their political leaders have
larger α.
We are interested in cases where players’ costs are low enough that they have some
marginal utility for entering the war even if they knew their opponent would never
quit. Remember that we assume that L’s cost is lower than M’s cost; otherwise L
would just fight until her own ideal time and then quit, with no need for convincing
M to support the war. Furthermore, using Λ¯(p) = pΛ + (1− p)λ, I assume
FcB(cB) >0 (2.5a)
cM
piv
<Λ¯(p0) (2.5b)
cL >pivλ (2.5c)
The quitting times are illustrated in Figure 2.4 using t∗ as defined in (2.3).12 Here,
2.5a states that there are types of B who wish to always fight and 2.5b states that
when M does not know the international signal, M wishes to fight for some time
regardless of B’s strategy— although, it is possible for M to not favor war after the
long signal.
Whenever M believes that L has received L, M’s ideal quitting time is shown in
the first row (t∗M(p(0|L)). However, M’s action does not result in any change in L’s
behavior until t∗L|NPS(p(0|L)), at which point L’s continued fighting is conditioned on
12. Note that given the constraints in (2.5), the graphs in Figure 2.4 are not unique representations
of the relative locations of t∗s, e.g., the constraints do not inform us about the relative location of
t∗L|PS in the first row and t
∗
L|NPS in the third row.
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Figure 2.4: Cost constraints translated to optimal quitting times, t∗, as defined in (2.3).
Beliefs at t = 0 are not shown. These are p(0|L), in the first row, p0, in the second row, and
p(0|S) in the third row.
M’s support. So, if M is ever certain that the international signal indicates a long
war, tM ≤ t∗L|NPS(p(0|L)). Similarly, when M is certain that the international signal
is the short signal, as shown in the bottom row in Figure 2.4, M must support the
war until her ideal time and must not support the war after t∗L|NPS(p(0|S)).
There are a few differences in the solution depending on the relative location of
t∗M in the middle row in Figure 2.4 (ideal quitting time of the uninformed M), and
t∗L|NPS in the first row (ideal quitting time of the leader after knowing the war is long
and without public support). I will discuss these in the following two cases:
Case I: t∗M (p(0)) < t∗L|NPS (p(0|L))
Here, the uninformed M prefers to quit before a leader who has received L wants
to quit if the leader does not have public support.
Proposition 2.2. Given the constraints in (2.5) and Case I, the following hold in
every equilibrium:
– M ignores L’s domestic signal and quits at tM , where 0 ≤ tM ≤ t∗L|NPS(p(0|L)).
– L always quits at her optimal quitting time given no public support for war, i.e.
tL = t
∗
L|NPS(p(0|S)) after the short signal and tL = t∗L|NPS(p(0|L)) after the long
signal.
– If cB < c˜B(tL), B never quits, otherwise tB = t∗B(cB).
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Proof. The proof follows from Proposition 2.1. First assume L is playing a pooling
equilibrium at the outset. This leaves M uninformed about the true value of the
international signal which means all the strategies that involve M’s support for war
after t∗L|NPS(p(0|L)) are strictly dominated. L’s strategy is to fight until her optimal
time given the lack of support from M. And B’s strategy is similarly determined by
Proposition 2.1. The beliefs also can be constructed from (2.1) and (2.2), similar to
Proposition 2.1.
Second, L may send an informative domestic signal at the outset but this is only
possible if M ignores the signal. Otherwise, L would always send the signal that buys
longer support from M. It is possible for M to ignore L’s informative signal because
M is ambivalent over a wide range of time.
The set described by Proposition 2.2 includes infinitely many equilibria, but they
are essentially identical in terms of prescribed quitting times for L and B. The only
source of multiplicity is that M can withdraw support from the war at any time up
to the moment when it actually makes a difference.
A suitable refinement on the infinitely many equilibria described by Proposition
2.2 is to select that subset in which M acts truthfully: M stops supporting the war
when the war is no longer deemed a worthy option for M. This gives the following
corollary.
Corollary. Given the constraints in (2.5), there is a unique truthful equilibrium
in which L sends an uninformative domestic signal and tM = t∗M(p0).
Even when L sends an uninformative domestic signal, if the war continues beyond
L’s ideal point after L, M becomes certain that L has received S. But M cannot gain
information before withdrawing because the separation that informs M happens as a
result of M’s not supporting the war. Furthermore, M’s withdrawal does not affect
its own payoff.
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Case II: t∗L|NPS (p(0|L)) < t∗M (p(0))
Under this condition, an uninformed M wishes the war to continue past the point
where a leader who does not have public support and has received the long signal
wants war. But regardless of whether the war is short or long, the leader wants to
fight a longer war than what M would want if M knew the international signal. So,
again, M does not have any incentive to support the war past t∗L|NPS (p(0|L)) and
Proposition 2.2 still holds.
Note, however, that the corollary to Proposition 2.2 does not follow. The reason
is that t∗M (p(0)) is beyond what Proposition 2.2 prescribes.
In both cases, side A always quits at L’s ideal time without public support, which
is always past M’s ideal point (if M had access to the international signal). But only
wars that continue long enough to be ended because of L’s concession are going to be
fought past M’s ideal quitting time. This is more likely to happen for long wars, as
short wars are more likely to end before they reach that stage.
Wars with High Stakes
Throughout the discussion thus far, it has always been assumed that the war is a
war about matters that are not very important to citizens. What happens if we relax
this assumption? We can relax this assumption in full, or in part as shown below.
The result in an much simplified solution, and virtually a single equilibrium.
L always Wants to Fight, but not M
Assume cM > pivλ, but cL < pivλ. This means that L, regardless of her belief about
the length of the war, M’s support, and B’s behavior, will always find it profitable to
continue fighting. As a result, in every equilibrium, B always quits at its t∗(cB), and
L always fights. M’s action has no effect on the outcome.
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M also always Wants to Fight
Assume cM < pivλ, which also implies cL < pivλ. This means that both L and
M, regardless of their beliefs about the length of the war and B’s behavior, will
always find it profitable to continue fighting. As a result, similar to above, in every
equilibrium B always quits at its t∗(cB), and M’s action has no effect. But this time
there are no agency problems between the L and M, because regardless of the observed
international signal, they always prefer the same action.
Note also that due to the assumption of issue indivisibility, if B also has a low cost
for fighting (if B is a hothead), the strategy of both sides is to always fight. That is,
neither side will ever concede and the war continues until it ends because of military
victory for one side.
Adding More Citizens
Having studied the model with one citizen, let us see what happens if we increase
the number of citizens. Assume that country A has a continuum of citizens, collec-
tively referred to as M (for masses). Each citizen is a player and can either ‘quit’ or
‘fight’ as before. L’s cost of fighting at time t is cL(t) = c` + αm(t), as before, with
the only difference that m(t) is interpreted as the proportion of citizens who have
quit at or before time t. Also, suppose that every citizen’s value for victory is v and
the citizens’ costs of fighting are distributed by cumulative density function FcM (c),
which is assumed to be continuous.
Similar to, (2.5), assume the following constraints on costs:
FcB(cB) >0 (2.6a)
FcM (cM) >0 (2.6b)
c` + α
(
1− FcM (cM)
)
>cM . (2.6c)
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Remember that ci = piivλ, is the lowest cost with which there is a possibility that
player i may wish to quit at some point. The first two constraints mean that there
are some types of B and some citizens in A who value the war so much that they
would like their side to continue fighting even if they knew the other side would never
quit.The last constraint is similar to (2.5c), and means that, without public support,
L does not want to fight forever, if she knows that B is never quitting.
The idea is not to find all the equilibria of this game for almost any outcome can
be supported by an equilibrium. This is because no citizen can profitably deviate
from any equilibrium. Rather, we want to see if the truthful equilibrium we found in
the case of one citizen—under Case I—holds here or not. The answer is affirmative.
Assume that L has sent a truthful domestic signal and both L and the citizens
are playing a truthful strategy. When does L quit? The last citizen to quit before
the war ends and L must have the same t∗. Since L and citizens have the same belief
about the war, this means the last citizen to quit and L have similar costs. Let c∗M
denote this cost. We have
c` + α
(
1− FcM (c∗M)
)
= c∗M . (2.7)
Define
G(x) = c` + α
(
1− FcM (x)
)− x.
From (2.6c), we have G(cM) < 0. Also, because FcM is a cumulative density func-
tion we have limx→∞G(x) > 0, and dGdx < 0. Since G is a continuous function, the
intermediate value theorem implies that (2.7) is guaranteed to have a unique solution.
Similar to (2.7), we can find L’s truthful quitting time if citizens are uninformed
about the international signal. In this case, only the quitting times of L and the last
citizen are the same, not their costs. Let c∗
M |L and c
∗
M |S denote the cost of the last
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citizen to quit before L quits in the case that L has received L or S. We have
t∗
(
c∗
M |L, p(0)
)
= t∗
(
c` + α
(
1− FcM (c∗M |L)
)
, p(0|L)
)
(2.8)
t∗
(
c∗
M |S, p(0)
)
= t∗
(
c` + α
(
1− FcM (c∗M |S)
)
, p(0|S)
)
, (2.9)
which both yield unique solutions again using intermediate value theorem. It suffices
to plug in cM = cM and cM =∞ in each of the equations and to see that the left-hand
sides are decreasing in cM and the right-hand sides are increasing in cM .
Proposition 2.3. Given the constraints in (2.6), the following strategies are played
in a truthful equilibrium
– Citizens ignore L’s domestic signal and each of them quits at his or her ideal
quitting time t∗
(
cM , p(0)
)
.
– If the international signal is L, L quits at tL = c∗M |L. If the international signal
is S, L quits attL = c∗M |S.
– If cB < c˜B(tL), B never quits, otherwise tB = t∗B(cB).
The proof simply follows from Proposition 2.1, the definitions of c∗
M |L and c
∗
M |S,
and the fact that no citizen can profitably deviate from any strategy.
Also, note that as in the single-citizen game, there can be no meaningful separation
of types of L. If L plays a separating equilibrium in which the domestic signal informs
the behavior of citizens in the correct direction, L always has the incentive to send
the wrong signal after receiving L.
2.5 Discussion
The analysis showed that assuming fixed effort levels and fixed average costs,
learning about costs happens very fast; I used this insight to build a model with
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fixed costs and study how people can learn about expected duration of wars. In
reality, war casualties are overdispersed due to a variety of reasons, including seasonal
changes, changes in fighting strategies, results of previous battles, and presence of
allies. Regardless of the extent to which we can assume that each period of the war
is the same as previous periods, the assumption serves us as an analytical tool that
allows isolation of the effect of time.
In this section, I will discuss some of the substantive implications that can be
drawn from the formal model presented. The main point of the models is that people
can make inferences about the type of war that is being fought based on duration.
This is conceptually distinct from inference based on costs or based on what the elite
say. In the models, citizens stop supporting a war because the war is likely to be a
long war not worth fighting. The cost of fighting in each period is part of the calculus,
but the source of information in the models is the time that has elapsed since the
start of the war.
That the half-life of public support for asymmetric wars only partly depends on the
number of fallen soldiers means that ignoring the causal effect of “duration” produces
biased estimates of support, with potentially disastrous outcomes. This might be part
of the reason that such estimates are seen to have overestimated “casualty tolerance”
by as much as a factor of 60 (Larson and Savych 2005, Table 6.1).13
When to Fight, When to Quit
To obtain hypotheses about aggregate behavior, we are going to assume citizens
are playing the truthful equilibrium in the model with many citizens. To obtain
hypotheses about individual behavior, we have to make other assumptions. One of
the dependent variables of interest is citizens’ strength of support for war. Let us
13. Larson and Savych attribute the error to using mean instead of median and using academic con-
trolled lab experiments as opposed to “actual public opinion data collected during relevant historical
episodes.
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assume that each citizen’s expressed level of support for war—as observed in public
opinion polls, for example—is detectably affected by his or her belief about how likely
they consider the war being fought to be a war worth fighting.
From (2.2) we obtain ∂pi(t)/∂t < 0, which means that as time progresses during
a war, everybody becomes less confident that the war being fought is a short war.
This comparative static prediction holds across all the equilibria.
Hypothesis 2.1. As time progresses, every citizen’s support for war should decline.
Hypothesis 2.2. As time progresses, every citizen’s expectation of the remaining
length of war should increase.
Another important question is, if everyone’s expected benefit from war is going
to go down over time, when will citizens stop supporting the war? If we assume that
citizens support for war is truthful, we can study t∗M , defined in (2.3), to obtain the
comparative statics of interest.
In the derivation of (2.3) we observed that c = piivλ is the threshold of cost below
which t∗i = +∞. Hence, if a citizen’s per unit cost of fighting is less than pivλ, that
citizen always supports the war, because, for that citizen, even a long war is worth
fighting. Nonetheless, as time progresses, the citizen is going to be less optimistic
about the war. In other words, these citizens are going to be disenchanted about the
war over time, like others, but they value the prize so highly relative to the costs of
war that they are willing to support the war ad infinitum.
Hypothesis 2.3. Citizens whose value for victory with respect to the cost of fighting
is more than a threshold will never stop supporting the war.
Among citizens whose support for war is not eternal, the time they stop supporting
the war depends on their costs and their initial belief about the likelihood of the war
being a short war. Specifically, we have ∂t∗M/∂cM < 0 and ∂t∗M/∂p0 > 0. These
comparative statics result in the following hypotheses.
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Hypothesis 2.4. Citizens whose value for victory are lower, stop supporting the
war sooner.
Hypothesis 2.5. The more one is confident that the current war is a short war,
the longer one is going to support the war.
Hypothesis 2.5 may seem illogical at first, but it is straightforward if we look at it
from a different perspective. It says that a citizen who initially has a stronger belief
that the war is a short war will require more adverse information to rule that the war
is indeed a long war.
Putting Hypotheses 2.1, 2.3, and 2.4 together, we realize that citizens will stop
supporting the war whenever their ideal quitting times are reached. This means
a secular decline in public support for war, but the exact shape depends on the
distribution of costs of war among citizens. Note, however, that if there are citizens
whose costs of war are lower than a specific threshold, there will be an asymptote in
public support: the support will get increasingly close to, but never lower than, the
asymptote.
Hypothesis 2.6. As time proceeds, public opinion in support of war should decline,
but it can asymptotically stay larger than zero.
The model also provides us insight about the strategic behavior of the two ad-
versaries. In particular, Proposition 2.1 showed that as long as there is a non-zero
chance that the weak party is a low-cost type who never wishes to stop fighting, the
strong side has a time table for quitting. As shown in various equilibrium descrip-
tions, domestic institutions and domestic politics determine whose time table is the
time table based on which State A fights and stops fighting, but, State A always has
a time table. Note that the weak side can have little chance of victory and still find
fighting profitable due to the leverage it gets from the information asymmetry. A side
result is that given the importance of being perceived as a likely low-cost type (i.e.,
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B not being seen as certainly not a low-cost type), it is natural to expect B to carry
out ostensibly irrational acts.
Another result of Proposition 2.1 which also showed up in all the equilibria of the
models is that for wars that do not end fast, there is a period of fighting during which
both sides know that no one is quitting. This is similar in appearance to Fearon’s
“fighting rather than bargaining”, but the underlying reason is different (Fearon 2007).
This discussion also provides a way of looking back at one of the rhetorical battles
at the peak of the Iraq war that was alluded to in the introductory passage: supporters
of the war maintained that setting a time table, any timetable, was a concession to the
enemy. Two notable examples of this rhetoric were the national dialog that followed
the release of the report produced by the Iraq Study Group, and the 2008 presidential
campaigns (Baker, Hamilton, et al. 2006).
The model confirms part of the logic. If one side has a publicly known deadline,
the types of the other side whose quitting times are close to the set deadline are
not going to quit (see Figure 2.3). But this does not mean that the strong side can
continue playing without an implicit deadline. Therefore, the discussion is not really
about whether or not to have a deadline, but when the deadline should be. This
question is, as shown above, a question about the expected cost of war, the value of
victory, and the expected duration of the war.
These results, of course, depend on the assumptions of the model. In particular,
it was assumed that side A’s domestic politics happens in public. Undoubtedly there
is a conspicuous discrepancy between democratic and autocratic states in this regard,
but they both have a more or less public discourse about war compared to, say, a
terrorist group.
Finally, it must be emphasized that the novelty in some of the above hypotheses
is that they are derived without assuming any irrationality on the part of any of the
players.
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Domestic institutions
Differences between democracies and autocracies in winning wars and also in the
length of their fighting has generated much academic interest (Reiter and Stam 1998;
Lyall 2010). We want to compare the results in the two institutional settings studied.
In order to gain insight from the models, we have to make further assumptions. Here,
I assume that α depends on the regime type and is larger in democracies and that in
the model with many citizens, the truthful equilibrium is played.
If the war continues long enough to be ended by side A’s withdrawal, L quits
fighting due to the pressure of the public. Furthermore, it is clear that higher α
implies larger cost and shorter wars (i.e., ∂t
∗
L
∂α
< 0). To better capture the dependence
of α on domestic political institutions, a natural candidate is the size of the winning
coalition as defined by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003).
Hypothesis 2.7. Holding everything constant, leaders with larger winning coalition
sizes are less likely to fight long asymmetric wars.s
2.6 Conclusion
Public support for many wars seem to start high and then decline over time. It
is often assumed that the public obtains information over time, but the source of
this information has been subject to much disagreement. Conventional wisdom holds
that aggregate cost of war is the main source of information. But, whereas a citizen
concerned about the past may truly care about the total cost of war, a forward-looking
citizen uses the available information (including costs) to foresee the likely path of
the war in the future. As such, the consequential questions are how costly the war
is, how long the war is going to last, and how much victory is worth, not whether a
specific threshold for cost has been crossed.
I showed that under usual assumptions of formal models of conflict, learning about
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the intensity of wars (the speed with which costs accrue) takes less time than learning
about the expected length of wars. Then I presented a model of public opinion dy-
namics that allows for wars to have a randomly determined expected duration, while
holding the intensity of the war and the value of victory constant and publicly known.
One of the results is that time itself is a critical source of information about war. The
attrition of public support for war is what we can expect to happen even when citizens
are forward-looking, rational, and aware of the speed of spending resources in war.
The model also provides a basic comparison between domestic institutions that
do not hold the leader accountable (like personal dictatorships) and those that do
(like democracies). It is predicted that, holding everything else constant, states with
fewer constraints on their political leaders fight longer asymmetric wars. When the
stakes are valued above a threshold, however, there is no difference between different
institutional settings.
Appendix II.A Intensity versus Duration
Posterior probabilities
Let V and W denote random variables indicating the value of µ and λ of the war
and X(t) and Y be the total cost at time t and duration of the war under scenarios
I and II, respectively. Assume that the war has lasted until time t. Using Bayes’
rule the updated belief about V and W are as follows. Under the first scenario, the
conditional probability of the high cost war is
P (V = 2|X(t) = k) = P (X(t)|V = 2)
P (X(t)|V = 1) + P (X(t)|V = 2)
=
(µ2t)
ke−µ2t
(µ1t)ke−µ1t + (µ2t)ke−µ2t
=
αke−(α−1)µ1t
αke−(α−1)µ1t + 1
, (2.10)
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and under the second scenario, the conditional probability of the long war is
P (W = 1|t) = P (t|W = 1)
P (t|W = 1) + P (t|W = 2)
=
e−λ1t
e−λ1t + e−λ2t
=
1
e−(α−1)λ1t + 1
. (2.11)
Expected Information
Let I and H denote Shannon’s information and entropy measures. Under the first
scenario we have
I1 ≡ E[I(V ;X(t))] = E[H(V )−H(V |X(t))]
= 1−
∫ ∞
0
λe−λtH(V |X(t))dt
= 1−
∫ ∞
0
∞∑
k=0
(µ1t)
ke−µ1t + (µ2t)ke−µ2t
2 k!
H(V |X(t) = k)λe−λtdt.
We can calculate H(V |X(t) = k) as H(V |X(t) = k) = −A log(A)−(1−A) log(1−A),
where A = P (V = 2|X(t) = k) given in (2.10). Under the second scenario and using
(2.11) we obtain
I2 ≡ I(W ;T ) = E[H(W )−H(W |T )]
= 1− 1
2
∫ ∞
0
(
λ1e
−λ1t + λ2e−λ2t
)
H(W |T = t)dt
= 1− 1
2
∫ ∞
0
(
λ1e
−λ1t + λ2e−λ2t
)(
log
(
1 + e−(α−1)λ1t
)
+
(α− 1)λ1t
1 + e(α−1)λ1t
)
dt.
Appendix II.B Equilibrium Concept
Here I will describe the equilibrium concept used in this chapter in more detail.
I will present the details for the reduced game Γw that was used in Section 2.4.
Extension to the full game is trivial.
Recall that there are two players in Γw. Nature decides the type of war and then
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Figure 2.5: Γw. The game continues if both players play ‘fight’ and the exogenous event
does not end the war. All the light gray cells are terminal histories. Each cell in the matrices
is an information set because nature’s decision in selecting the type of war and the type of
B (cB) is not shown in the graph.
sends an identical signal to the players. Then, the players may start fighting at
t = 0. If there is war, the war is fought in continuous time as the players have to
simultaneously choose between ‘quit’ and ‘fight’ at each instant. The war continues
until either—at least—one side quits, or one side loses on the battlefield.
Let I denote all the information sets and let Ij be all the information sets in which
player j plays. In Γw, if the war continues until some time t, both players must have
played ‘fight’ at every information set up to time t (see Figure 2.5). Furthermore,
both players should play at every information set. Therefore, we have
I = IL = IB = {S,L} ×R+ (2.12)
For every information set i ∈ Ij, let Γi denote the subgame that follows i. A belief
is a set that assigns for each variable unknown to player j a probability distribution
at every information set i in which player j plays. A set that contains a belief for
each player is called a belief profile.
In Γw, the only possible actions are fight and quit. Therefore, a belief set for player
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B should assign a probability distribution about the type of war to every moment
bB(s, t) = p(Λ|(s, t)) ∀(s, t) ∈ {S,L} ×R+.
For L, there is another unknown variable which is the type of B. Therefore,
bL(s, t) = {p(Λ|(s, t)), fcB(.|(s, t))} ∀(s, t) ∈ {S,L} ×R+.
Similarly, a strategy for player j takes the form of a mapping from every information
set to an action,
σi(s, t) : {S,L} ×R+ → {fight, quit}. (2.13)
We first need to derive the expected payoffs of the game. Assume that the players
follow (σ, b), where σ and b are the strategy profile and belief profile. Given these
beliefs and strategies, for every type of every player and every type of signal s let us
define qj(s) = min{τ > t|σj(s, τ) = ‘quit’} and
qj(s, t) =
 ∞ qj(s) does not existqj(s) otherwise (2.14)
Defined like this, qj is the first time that each player is expected to quit. Here, it
is assumed that strategies are right-continuous but this need not be the case; if a
player’s strategy includes quitting at some time but is not right-continuous, only the
boundary conditions of the following calculations need to be adjusted, and q should
be the infimum of quitting times.
qL and the distribution of qB are public knowledge. B knows her own cost. There
are three possible scenarios in terms of who quits first. (1) If qcB(s, t) > qL(s, t),
(2) if qcB(s, t) < qL(s, t) and (3) if qcB(s, t) = qL(s, t). Let us define V (x) such that
V (1) = v, V (2) = 0, and V (3) = v/2 where x is the case about q as it is enumerated
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above. Also let q(s, t) = min{qcB(s, t), qL(s, t)}.
Given the belief about the type of war, the probability density of the exogenous
event of the end of war is the convex combination of the probability densities of the
two types of war
w(τ) = p(Λ|(s, t))Λe−Λτ + (1− p(Λ|(s, t)))λe−λτ . (2.15)
Assume that W (τ) is the associated cumulative density function. We must have
W (t) = 0 because the exogenous event has not happened before time t. We can now
calculate the expected utility
EUcB
(
σ, b|(s, t)) (2.16)
=
∫
pr(exogenous event happening at τ) × payoff dτ
+ pr(war lasting until q)× payoff
=
∫ q(s,t)
t
w(τ)
(
(1− pi)ve−rτ −
∫ τ−t
0
cBe
−rθdθ
)
dτ
+ (1−W (q(s, t)))
(
V (x)e−rq(s,t) −
∫ q(s,t)−t
0
cBe
−rθdθ
)
.
The inside integral (over θ) is to calculate the discounted cost.
For L, the calculation is similar, except that we have to average over types of B.
For notational convenience, define ζ(cB) = qcB(s, t). We have
EUL
(
σ, b|(s, t)) (2.17)
=
∫
c|ζ(c)<qL(s,t)
fcB(c)
[
(1−W (ζ(c))
(
ve−rζ(c) −
∫ ζ(c)−t
0
cLe
−rθdθ
)
+
∫ ζ(c)
t
w(τ)
(
(1− pi)ve−rτ −
∫ τ−t
0
cBe
−rθdθ
)
dτ
]
dc
+
∫
c|ζ(c)=qL(s,t)
fcB(c)
[
(1−W (ζ(c))
(
v
2
e−rζ(c) −
∫ ζ(c)−t
0
cLe
−rθdθ
)
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+∫ ζ(c)
t
w(τ)
(
(1− pi)ve−rτ −
∫ τ−t
0
cBe
−rθdθ
)
dτ
]
dc
−
∫
c|ζ(c)>qL(s,t)
fcB(c)
[
(1−W (qL(s, t))
∫ qL(s,t)−t
0
cLe
−rθdθ
+
∫ qL(s,t)
t
w(τ)
(
(1− pi)ve−rτ −
∫ τ−t
0
cBe
−rθdθ
)
dτ
]
dc.
The three possibilities for quitting times (similar to the V (x) before) are explicitly
written, and the probability of each possibility is calculated by integrating over fcB .
The payoffs under each possibility are calculated as in (2.16).
A strategy for each player is a complete mapping as seen in (2.13). But it is
clear from (2.16, 2.17) that only the players’ first quitting time affects the payoffs,
represented by q (2.14). Of course, this is happening because the game ends after at
least one player quits. I rely on this payoff equivalence and narrow the attention on
only one of the strategies with the same q : always quit after q. This appears as the
third condition in the definition below.
Definition. A pair (σ∗, b∗) comprising a belief profile and a strategy profile is
called an equilibrium if it satisfies the following conditions:
(i) For every player j and every information set i, in which j plays, σ∗j is a best
reply. So σ∗j = arg maxσj E(Uj(σj, σ∗−j, b∗|i), where E(Uj(σj, σ∗−j), b∗|i) is the
expected payoff after the information set i, if j plays σj and other players play
according to σ∗, and b∗ is the belief.
(ii) For every player j, wherever possible, bj is obtained using Bayes’ rule with
correct priors, assuming that players follow σ∗.
(iii) If σ∗j prescribes that j should quit at information set i, it should also prescribe
that j should always quit in all the information sets that follow i.
The first two conditions are the sequential rationality and belief consistency that
are present in all flavors of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The last condition,
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as discussed before, does not affect equilibrium payoffs. In the example of Γw, since
information sets are (s, t), the third condition means that if σ∗j (s, t) = ‘quit’, it should
be the case that σ∗j (s, t) = ‘quit’ ∀(s, t′), t′ > t.
As mentioned before, the last condition vastly simplifies our descriptions of equi-
librium strategies. In the case of Γw, we can now describe each player’s equilibrium
strategy with a single number (and a possible superscript) which shows when player
i will quit for the first time. This is the notation used in the body of the paper.
Appendix II.C Existence of c˜B(τ)
I show that c˜B(τ) always exists. If cB ≤ c˜B(τ), B’s optimal quitting time is the
same as what was obtained in (2.3): when possible, this is the time when B’s marginal
payoff of fighting is zero. The payoff that a type of B with cost cB obtains from not
quitting until τ > 0, when looking down the game tree at time θ is obtained from the
following (nqaob stands for ‘not quitting at or before’)
EUB(θ, cB, B nqaob τ | L quits at τ) = (2.18)∫ τ−θ
0
(
(1− pB(θ))λe−λt + pB(θ)Λe−Λt
) (
(1− pi)ve−rt − cB(1− e−rt)/r
)
dt+∫ ∞
τ−θ
(
(1− pB(θ))λe−λt + pB(θ)Λe−Λt
)
dt
(
ve−rτ − cB(1− e−rτ )/r
)
,
where the first integral is for the chance that the exogenous event happens during
(θ, τ), conditioned on its not having happened before θ; the second integral is the
probability mass of the tail of the distribution of the exogenous event; and cB(1 −
e−rt)/r =
∫ t
0
cBe
−rθdθ is the aggregated and discounted cost of fighting up to time t.
Setting θ = t∗B(pB(0)) which is the optimal quitting time, if B is to quit, gives
Υ(cB, τ) = EUB (t
∗
B(pB(0), cB), cB, B nqaob τ | L quits at τ) .
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We can now use the intermediate value theorem to show that for all τ > 0, ĉ exists such
that Υ(ĉ, τ) = 0. It suffices that Υ(t∗−1B (pB(0), τ), τ) > 0, and limc→+∞Υ(cB, τ) < 0,
where the inverse of t∗ with respect to its first argument is assumed to exist because
it is strictly decreasing for τ > 0. Hence, we have
c˜B(t) = inf{ĉ, such that Υ(ĉ, τ) = 0},
which gives us Υ(c˜B, τ) = 0 because of the continuity of Υ.
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CHAPTER III
Keep Fighting or Quit
3.1 Introduction
The models presented in Chapter II had both behavioral predictions about indi-
viduals and institutional predictions about states with different regime types. In this
chapter I present some evidence corroborating these predictions.
I use two samples of American adults (one of them is a nationally representative
sample) to test some of the behavioral hypotheses using a survey experiment. The
results corroborate the basic predictions of the model: independent of the effect of
aggregate casualties, duration of a war may have a negative effect on public support
for war, and the longer a war lasts, citizens’ expectation about the remaining duration
of the war increases. To test the institutional hypothesis, I use existing data on coun-
terinsurgency wars of the past two centuries. I use domestic versus foreign counter
insurgency as a proxy for high and low stakes of wars. The analysis shows that in
counterinsurgency wars on foreign land (low stakes), leaders who are more institution-
ally accountable end their wars more quickly than leaders who are less accountable;
in domestic counter insurgencies (high stakes), however, domestic institutions are not
correlated with the duration of war.
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3.2 The Effect of Duration on Support
The formalization in the previous chapter predicted that duration has an inde-
pendent causal effect on support for war (see Hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2). But if the
main competing hypothesis is that it is aggregate causalities and not duration that
is affecting support for war, adjudicating between these two is virtually impossible in
observational studies. Time and any other monotonic function of time like aggregate
costs are highly correlated. Existing works show that public opinion is correlated with
aggregate cost, instantaneous cost, and whether instantaneous costs are increasing or
decreasing.1 Without imposing strict assumptions about underlying functional forms,
it is not possible to distinguish the effect of duration from the effect of aggregate cost.
To avoid this problem, I conducted a brief survey experiment.
Using experimental manipulation, we can assign hypothetical scenarios to survey
respondents and isolate the effects of parameters that vary together. Here, we want to
isolate the effect of duration and cost. Suppose that there is an ongoing asymmetric
war for the past t months, and we have incurred a specific level of cost (for example,
casualties). How does the level of support depend on when we observe this level
of cost? In other words, assume the cost is fixed and we can experimentally assign
different values of t to different citizens (treatment). How would the level of support
(outcome) be affected by t?
How does the level of support depend on t? If we subscribe to the idea that only
total casualties affect how we evaluate a war, then there should be no difference. If
citizens’ opinions only depend on the intensity with which casualties mount up, we
should expect support for war to be positively correlated with time. That is, for a
fixed level of cost, larger t means smaller rate of increase in casualties (i.e., slope)
which should be associated with more support. Moreover, if both aggregate cost and
1. See (Larson and Savych 2005) for a focus on aggregate costs, and Gartner 2008 for a focus on
recent costs and trends of costs.
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rate of accumulation of cost are operative, their total effect is still positive because
aggregate cost is fixed and rate of cost is negatively affected by duration. Finally, the
model presented in the Chapter II predicts a different relationship between duration
and support because the duration itself has also a causal effect. If the model is
correct, the result depends on parameters because level of support for war is pulled
in two opposite directions: on one hand, longer duration implies lower rate of cost
accumulation if the total cost is held constant (which make continuing the war more
attractive); on the other hand, longer duration means longer expected remaining
duration, which make continuing the war less attractive.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the prediction of the model for different values of total aggre-
gate cost and λ, assuming that Λ = 1/6, the a priori probability of facing a short war
is p0 = 0.75, and v (value of the prize) is randomly distributed among citizens with an
exponential distribution with mean 4000. The top row is how the model predicts pub-
lic opinion changes: given a rate of accumulation of costs, support for war decreases
until it reaches a plateau. The bottom row is the prediction in the hypothetical
exercise where total cost is fixed and support is estimated at any duration.
Figure 3.1 illustrates that when cost is fixed, depending on the parameters, the
independent effect of duration on support for war could be positive or negative and is
not necessarily monotonous. The expected duration of a short war is assumed to be
6 months; the result is that for low values of duration (up to about a year), citizens
are still optimistic about the length of the war, and longer time means lower rate of
costs which increases support. If the expected duration of the long war scenario is in
fact very long (which is what public opinion polls suggest), as time progresses, people
are going to expect that the war is to be very long and expected duration is large
enough that it eclipses a smaller expected rate of cost. Table 3.1 presents a selection
of numbers from Figure 3.1 for λ = 1/600. In this case, the effect of a five-fold increase
in duration is slightly larger than the effect of a five-fold increase in casualties.
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Figure 3.1: Simulation results showing percentage of support for continuation of an asym-
metric war for different values of time, predicted by the model in Chapter II. The top figures
show how the model predicts aggregate public opinion for different values of λ and casualty
rates. The bottom figures show how the model predicts the results of experimental manip-
ulation where total casualties is fixed but respondent are treated with different values of
time.
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Table 3.1: Duration can have a larger effect on support for war than total casualties. This
table is selected from the results in Figure 3.1, with Λ = 1/6 and λ = 1/600
Time Total Casualties = 300 Total Casualties = 1500
12 months 88.1% 53.4%
60 months 47.7% 2.5%
Design
Appendix III.A provides information about the recruitment process as well as
other practical details of the survey experiment. The two rounds of surveys are re-
ferred to as the first survey (convenience sample fielded in August 2015) and the
second survey (nationally representative sample fielded in March 2015). The experi-
ment was designed to provide a difference-in-difference test for a manipulation about
the observed length of war. Participants were shown a vignette about a war with the
Boko Haram, which is a terrorist group in Central Africa and both surveys were fielded
after periods when the name Boko Haram had been in the daily news (August 2014
and March 2015). Participants were told about a hypothetical situation (revealed as
such) where prominent members of both the Republican and the Democratic parties,
including the president, are in favor of initiating a war against the group. The war
has not started yet, but the president is expected to order the start of the war in a
few days.
Participants were asked whether they supported this war or not (presupport).
Then they were provided an update about the war. In the first survey, the update said
that the war has been going on for Tyear years and has had limited success, where
the treatment they received was an integer between 1 to 5. They also received another
treatment (Tkia ∈ {NA, 300, 1500}), which was either to see no casualty report, or to
see either 300 or 1500 as the number of American casualties. In the second survey,
to improve power there were only five treatment groups as follows:
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Treatment Group 1 2 3 4 5
Tkia 500 2500 500 2500 2500
Tyear 2 2 10 10 NA
After this information, respondents were asked about their opinion regarding the
continuation of the war (postsupport). Then, on the following page, they were
asked to estimate how much longer the war would last, if the United States were
committed to fight until victory (expduration). Support was measured using a
4-point Likert scale in the first survey and a 6-point Likert scale in the second survey.
Summary statistics of these variables are reported in Table 3.2.
The dependent variable for testing Hypothesis 2.1 is the difference between post-
support and presupport. This is denoted by ∆support. Expected duration of
war is directly asked and is used to test Hypothesis 2.2. Given the large variance of
expected duration (standard deviations of 22.61 years and 36.33 in the two surveys)
a logged dependent variable is used.
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics. For the first survey, N = 514 and for the second, N = 956.
Varible Min Mean Median Max Std. Dev.
Survey 1:
Tyear 1.00 2.94 3.00 5.00 1.40
Tkia (dropping NA) 300 874.06 300 1500 600.3
presupport 1.00 2.38 2.00 4.00 1.00
postsupport 1.00 2.35 2.00 4.00 1.06
∆support -3.00 -0.04 0.00 3.00 0.74
expduration 0.00 9.06 5.00 320 22.61
ln(expduration+1) 0.00 1.80 1.79 5.77 0.79
Survey 2:
Tyear (dropping NA) 2 5.91 2 10 4
Tkia 500 1682.01 2500 2500 983.8
presupport 1.00 3.77 4.00 6.00 1.83
postsupport 1.00 3.64 4.00 6.00 1.94
∆support -5.00 -0.14 0.00 5.00 1.52
expduration* 0.00 ∼30e3 5.00 30e6 ∼1e6
ln(expduration+1)* 0.00 1.96 1.79 17.22 1.02
* There are three observations of expduration larger than 1000 years. The results reported
in this chapter are obtained without dropping any observations, but the results do not
change if we the drop outliers of expduration.
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Results
Figures 3.2 and 3.3, for each treatment group in the nationally representative
sample, respectively show confidence intervals for change in support (∆support)
and predicted duration of war (logarithm of expduration).2 In Figure 3.2, for those
who received the low casualty treatment, the long duration treatment has a large and
statistically significant effect. For those who received the high casualty treatment,
the long duration treatment has resulted in lower levels of support, but the confidence
intervals of the three groups (Tyear=2, Tyear=10, and Tyear not specified) seem
to overlap. Interestingly, there is no perceptible difference between the two groups
which receivedTyear=10. What is seen in Figure 3.3 is very straightforward. Longer
observed duration seems to significantly increase the expected duration of war.
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show the results from the two rounds of surveys. The first
two models in each table show the results of the effect of duration on change in
support for war (Hypothesis 2.1). Because of the ordinal dependent variable, an
ordered choice model is the appropriate model. Models 3.3 and 3.7 have Tkia as the
only independent variable, and Models 3.2 and 3.6 add casualty treatment as another
explanatory variable. Because the treatments are randomly assigned, there is no
need to control for any other variable. The results corroborate the expectation that
an increase in the duration of a conflict has a negative impact on how much citizens
support the war. Surprisingly, total casualties has very weak statistical significance
(p-value > .10) .
Interpreting the magnitude of the effects seen in Models 3.1, 3.2, 3.5, and 3.6, like
any other multinomial choice model, is not straightforward. The results of Figure
3.2 provide a more natural interpretation—albeit, with the assumption that sup-
port for war is an interval measure. The difference between the change in support
for the groups that had a low casualty treatment of Tkia=500 is −0.55 (s.d. =
2. In Figure 3.2, respondents who opposed the war before the beginning of the war are dropped.
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0.177). Similarly, the difference between the change in support for the groups that
had a low casualty treatment of Tkia=2500 is −0.34 (s.d. = 0.177). Both of these
numbers are statistically significant but to make better sense of their practical sig-
nificance, let us transform them to a scale of 0 to 100. This gives the effect sizes of
−11% (difference between those who received Tkia=500, Tyear=2 and those who
received Tkia=500, Tyear=10) and −6.8% (difference between those who received
Tkia=2500, Tyear=2 and those who received Tkia=2500, Tyear=10).
Models 3.3, 3.4, 3.7, and 3.8, reported in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, test Hypothesis 2.2.3
Table 3.4 shows that in the nationally representative survey, changing Tyear from
2 years to 10 years, on average has increased expected duration of war by 66%.4
The experimental results strongly corroborate the basic behavioral predictions of
the formal models. These results encourage subsequent research to fully test the
implications of the model.
3. The logarithm of expected duration is used due to its large observed variance. The substantive
results presented here, however, are not sensitive to whether we use a logarithm transformed values
or not.
4. The dependent variable is logged, so we can calculate exp(0.063 ∗ (10− 2)) = 1.6553.
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Figure 3.2: Confidence intervals showing changes in level of support for war for the five
different treatment groups in the nationally representative sample. The vertical axis is
change in the six-point Likert scale measure of support for war. Respondents who opposed
the war even before the war was started are dropped.
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Figure 3.3: Confidence intervals showing expected duration of the remainder of the war
for different treatment groups in the nationally representative sample.
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Table 3.3: Experimental results show significant and substantively large effects of observed
duration of war on the change in support for the continuation of war as well as the expected
remaining duration of war.
∆Support ln(Expected Duration+1)
Variables Model 3.1 Model 3.2 Model 3.3 Model 3.4
Tyear -0.148 (0.067) -0.146 (0.067) 0.104 (0.024) 0.104 (0.025)
Tkia=300 0.004 (0.226) 0.000 (0.084)
Tkia=1500 -0.243 (0.229) -0.048 (0.085)
Intercept 1.493 (0.080) 1.509 (0.093)
Res. deviance 1043.4 1042.24
Adjusted R2 0.032 0.029
N 514 514 514 514
Models 3.1 and 3.2 are ordered logit and models 3.3 and 3.4 are ordinary least squares regressions.
Intercepts in the ordered logit models are suppressed.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table 3.4: Experimental results show significant and substantively large effects of observed
duration of war on the change in support for the continuation of war as well as the expected
remaining duration of war.
∆Support ln(Expected Duration+1)
Variables Model 3.5 Model 3.6 Model 3.7 Model 3.8
Tyear -0.048 (0.017) -0.048 (0.017) 0.067 (0.009) 0.067 (0.009)
Tkia -11e-5 (6.9e-5) -3.6e-5 (3.6e-5)
Intercept 1.566 (0.064) 1.642 (0.085)
Res. deviance 2545.11 2542.40
Adjusted R2 0.102 0.101
N 791 791 791 791
Models 3.5 and 3.6 are ordered logit and models 3.7 and 3.8 are ordinary least squares regressions.
Intercepts in the ordered logit models are suppressed.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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3.3 Duration of Counter-Insurgency Operations
In order to test Hypothesis 2.7, I rely on a data set of counterinsurgency (COIN)
wars collected by Jason Lyall.5 There are two criteria for a war to be included in this
data set: (1) there must be at least 1000 battle deaths, with at least 100 battle deaths
on each side; (2) the insurgents must rely on guerrilla tactics and seek to obtain the
allegiance of at least a portion of the population.
There is not a one-to-one relationship between counterinsurgencies and what is
defined here as asymmetric wars: some asymmetric wars are not COIN, and some
COINs are not asymmetric. I will rely on a partial remedy for this problem by
focusing on COINs where the state is fighting in an occupied territory. The reason
is that fighting domestic insurgents is often an important matter of national security,
which can hardly be characterized as a low-stakes war. With this added criterion,
the sample is the population of asymmetric wars in the past two centuries where the
incumbent state is an occupying force. For comparison, I will also provide the results
for domestic COINs as well.
The design departs from Lyall’s original analysis of this data set in two main
ways. First, instead of relying on measures of democracy, I will use size of the win-
ning coalition from the selectorate theory, which, as argued before, better captures
the difference between the two institutional settings in my models.6 Second, as men-
tioned above, wars are analyzed in two partitions: when the state fights a domestic
insurgency, and when the state is an occupier. Hypothesis 2.7 only applies to the
latter.
The unit of observation is COIN wars. The dependent variable is duration of
wars in months. The failure event is either the end of the war, or the end of the war
5. Details of the data collection procedures as well as summary statistics can be found in (Lyall
2010).
6. See Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) for an introduction to the selectorate theory and an
application to the democratic peace. For a thorough treatment of the subject and a variety of
application refer to (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).
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only if the state does not win; this distinction is discussed in more detail below. The
explanatory variable of interest is w (size of the winning coalition). Both w and s
(size of the selectorate) range from 0 to 1. I will control for a number of explanatory
variables typically associated with war outcome or war duration (Reiter and Stam
1998; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Lyall and Wilson III 2009; Lyall 2010). power is
the log of the power of the state as coded by the correlates of war project (Ghosn,
Palmer, and Bremer 2004). cold war is a binary variable showing whether the war
happens during the Cold War (1946-1989) or not. mech is a measure of how much
an army relies on machines instead of soldiers. The measure is based on the ratio of
motorized vehicles to soldiers one year prior to the start of the conflict, and ranges
from 1 (lowest mechanization) to 4; the variable is 0 for wars before 1917 (Lyall and
Wilson III 2009). support measures whether the insurgents had material support
from or sanctuary within a foreign state; the variable takes 0 if they had neither,
1 if they had one but not the other, and 2 if they had both material support and
sanctuary. distance is the logged value of the distance between the capital and the
primary battle zone (in kilometers). elevation is a the log of average altitude of the
battleground (in meters).
Using Schoenfeld residuals, we cannot reject the assumption of proportional haz-
ard, and therefore, I will use Cox proportional hazard estimation for the analysis
(Schoenfeld 1982). Robustness checks reported in Appendix III.B show that the sub-
stantive results do not depend on this assumption, as, for example, essentially similar
results are obtained if we assume a generalized gamma distribution. The empirical
models used are variations of the following model.
λ(t|w, s, X) = λ0(t) exp(α1w+ α2s+ β′X),
where λ(t) is the hazard function, w and s are sizes of the winning coalition and
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selectorate, X is a vector of covariates for each observation, and λ0(t) is the underlying
hazard function. The parameter of interest is α1, which is reported as a hazard ratio,
i.e., as exp(α1).
Table 3.5 shows the results. There are two models with similar parametric specifi-
cation. The models differ in how the events are specified. In Model I, I assume that a
war lasts until it ends in any possible outcome. In Model II, I assume that a war lasts
until it ends in a draw or a loss for the state; if a war ends in victory for the state,
I will consider that war right-censored because, one might say, the true end of the
support for war has not been observed. It is not clear which model is a better choice
for testing Hypothesis 2.7. On one hand, we are interested in how long support for a
war lasts, and a war that ends in victory should be treated differently from wars that
end before victory is achieved. On the other hand, the concept of victory is fluid and
endogenous to the trajectory of the war.7
Each model is tested on two subsamples: when the state is fighting a domestic
insurgent, and when the state is an occupying force. The result is in clear support of
the hypothesis: higher levels of w is associated with shorter COINs only when the
wars are in foreign lands. The reported coefficients are proportional hazard rates,
which makes the interpretation of the results straightforward: for example, in the
right hand column of Model I, at any moment, a state with W= 1 is 3.87 times
more likely than a state with W= 0 to observe a war ending event, assuming that
everything else is held constant.
A number of different model specifications, hazard distributions, and different
ways of calculating standard errors have been tested. Appendix III.B provides some
of these robustness checks. Due to the small number of cases and the underlying
correlations, the hazard rate varies widely, but the substantive result remains the
same.
7. For a discussion on the many synonyms of “victory” and different levels of victory see (Martel
2006, Chapter 4).
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Table 3.5: Results of the survival time analysis for counterinsurgency war. When fighting
as an occupying force, states with a larger winning coalition size (higher W) stop their
fights against insurgencies more quickly than others. Models I and II only differ in what is
considered a failure event.
Model I Model II
Failure event any end of war war ends in loss or draw
Variables Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign
w 1.495 3.865 0.876 7.368
(0.293) (0.001) (0.804) (0.031)
s 0.804 2.099 0.906 2.028
(0.550) (0.105) (0.813) (0.297)
power 0.886 1.108 0.784 0.914
(0.005) (0.119) (0.007) (0.460)
support=1 0.869 2.945 1.197 7.313
(0.546) (0.000) (0.630) (0.000)
support=2 0.490 1.278 0.689 1.562
(0.008) (0.350) (0.280) (0.329)
distance 0.953 0.782 0.941 0.807
(0.142) (0.000) (0.160) (0.061)
mech 0.904 0.785 1.114 0.845
(0.227) (0.013) (0.387) (0.255)
elevation 0.963 0.919 0.889 0.956
(0.434) (0.236) (0.157) (0.739)
cold war 0.469 0.612 0.396 0.861
(0.000) (0.058) (0.000) (0.648)
Observations (clusters) 155 (65) 90 (21) 155 (65) 90 (21)
Number of failures 155 90 74 38
Wald χ2 37.87 65 28.85 59.43
Log Pseudo-Lik -618.2 -306.9 -267.4 -122.5
Reported coefficients are hazard ratios from the Cox proportional hazard model, with Breslow
method for resolving ties. Robust two-tailed p-values, obtained from standard errors clustered
on individual country codes, are reported in parentheses.
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Finally, note that while the result of Table 3.5 may seem to contradict Lyall’s
original work, it is a different result to a different question. Lyall’s work is concerned
with counterinsurgencies per se, and whether democracies, as argued by some scholars,
perform worse than non-democraceis in counterinsurgency operations. His results are,
as his extensive study shows, remarkably robust. But the focus of my work has been
on counterinsurgencies fought on a foreign land, and the institutional feature I am
interested in is the size of the winning coalition.8
The results provided here improve our confidence in Hypothesis 2.7. Note, how-
ever, that the number of observations is very small (especially when failure is assumed
to only mean loss or draw), and the analysis probably suffers from omitted variable
bias. There is probably little justification for a causal interpretation of the results
of duration models presented here, except that the state-level results agree with our
theoretical expectations and individual-level results.
3.4 Conclusion
I tested the main institutional and behavioral hypotheses of the model. Since
time is highly correlated with any aggregate measure of cost, it is not possible to test
the behavioral predictions using available observational data. I relied on a survey
experiment to provide a preliminary test of the theory. The results show that as a
war continues, citizens’ support for the continuation of the war decreases while their
estimation about its expected remaining length increases. I used counterinsurgency
wars to test the institutional hypothesis. In counterinsurgency wars, leaders with a
larger winning coalition (in their domestic institutions) end their wars more quickly
8. For a methodological discussion on the differences between size of the winning coalition and
other measures of democracy refer to (Clarke and Stone 2008; Morrow et al. 2008). Using polity
score’s measure of executive constraints (xconst) yields similar results, but the results are dependent
on model specification. Moreover, w is better than xconst on methodological grounds; one of the
reasons is that it is a ratio measure, as opposed to xconst which is ordinal. Using selectorate
theory’s W/S measure gives almost exactly the same results as w.
61
when the war is outside their own state, whereas for domestic counterinsurgency wars
(presumably, due to the high stakes of the war), there is no perceptible difference
between states with large or small winning coalitions.
Appendix III.A Survey Design and Recruitment
Survey Flow
The survey flow was as follows: a number of demographic question (gender, age,
education, income, and political ideology; only asked in the first survey), a question
about participants’ ideology (branching Likert scale ranging from 1 to 7), the war
vignette (reflected below), a question about their level of support for war (branching
Likert scale ranging from 1 to 4 in the first survey and ranging from 1 to 6 in the
second survey), information about the war (which provided two types of treatment:
length of time since the beginning of the war and casualty information, a question
about their level of support for the continuation of the war (branching Likert scale
from 1 to 4 in the first survey and ranging from 1 to 6 in the second survey), reminding
the information about war, and a question about their expectation for the remainder
of the war if the United States decided to fight until the terrorists are completely
disarmed. Two trick questions were asked: one in the middle of the demographic
question and the other at the end of the survey. Both asked simple arithmetic ques-
tions, but instructed participants to choose a specific wrong answer instead of solving
the question, to test their attentiveness.
War Introduction Vignette
The following is a hypothetical scenario about a war with a terrorist group
that has recently been in the news. Please read the description carefully.
Boko Haram is a terrorist group in Central Africa. They have been re-
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cently involved in a number of high profile terrorist activities, including
kidnapping schoolgirls. They now control parts of Nigeria and Cameroon
and they have also threatened to harm the United States. Some intel-
ligence experts have argued that Boko Haram is trying to acquire the
capability to carry out terrorist operations within the United States. The
US is going to start a war with this group. The goal of the war is to
destroy Boko Haram’s military capabilities. The president as well as the
leading figures of both Democratic and Republican parties support this
war. In a televised speech, the president has informed the nation that he
“will do whatever it takes to defeat Boko Haram.” It is expected that the
president will order the start of the war within a few days.
War Information
Treatment category is randomly selected and Tyear and Tkia are chosen de-
pending the treatment category.
The US has been fighting this war for some time now. We want to know
how you would think about this war. Here are some critical information
about the war. Please read them carefully and spend a moment thinking
about the situation. You will be tested on this information.
– [Not shown if Tyear=NA] The war has been going on for [Tyear] years.
– [Not shown if Tkia=NA] In this period, [Tkia] American soldiers have lost their
lives.
– Boko Haram has been weakened, but they continue to operate a global network
of terrorism.
– The war still has bipartisan support in the US Congress.
Recruitment of Participants
The first survey relied on MTurk to recruit respondents. Mturk participants have
been shown to be different from a representative sample of the American public.
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While this may be worrisome for surveys, it is not necessarily a source of concern for
experimental designs. There is a growing body of published research that is relying
on MTurk and investigations are showing MTurk to be better than an undergrad-
uate convenience sample in that MTurk results are closer to results obtained from
representative samples of the public (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012).
A task was defined requesting 600 participants (1 per person) and offering $0.30
to each successful participant. Participants were recruited with three conditions: Be
inside the United States, have a total approval rating equal or greater than 90%, and
have at least completed 50 job requests before. Participants were instructed that
they need to be American citizens, connecting from a regular Internet connection,
and not connecting from a mobile device. The description said that the survey was
for academic research and that geographic information would be collected to make
sure participants were within the United States. Participants needed to follow a
link to Qualtrics website to take the survey. The first page of the survey informed
participants that they should read the questions carefully and that failing to follow
instructions may result in early termination of the survey. Participants who reached
the last page were given a personal token to enter in MTurk. They were rewarded
based on their token.
In total, 722 workers started the survey but 111 either voluntarily dropped out of
the survey or were led to the end of the survey because they failed one of the trick
questions. Extensive efforts were made to remove participants who did not connect
from the United States, connected from a known problematic IP address, connected
using a mobile device, or failed to correctly answer manipulation checks. After this
cleaning process, 514 rows of data remained. The removal was not based on the values
of the variables.
Because drawing the policy-relevant lessons from this research requires the ability
to generalize to the American adult population, the second survey relied on Survey
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Sampling International (SSI) to field the survey to an existing panel and match the
sample to the American adult population on age, gender, race, income, education, and
geographic location. The target was set at N = 1000 which was reached after 2575
respondents had started the survey. Respondents who failed to correctly answer two
trick questions were not able to continue. After removing respondents who had failed
to correctly answer manipulation checks, 956 rows of data remained. The removal
was not based on the values of the variables.
Appendix III.B Robustness Checks
Survey Experiment
The results reported in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 reflect the design prior to the fielding
of the survey. The model specifications are minimal and no observation has been
removed from the data, except for those which were dropped because of geographic
location outside the US or those who failed treatment checks.
It may be the case that we are only observing a positive correlation between dura-
tion treatment and expected remaining duration because participants are mindlessly
repeating the duration treatment they have received as the expected duration. Re-
moving the observations where Tyear=expduration is a simple way to check if
this is the case. Doing so reduces the correlation, but the result is still substantively
large and statistically significant: in the first survey (Model 3.3) we obtain βˆ = 0.084
(s.e.=0.030) and in the second survey (Model 3.7 ) we obtain βˆ = 0.035 (s.e.=0.012).
There remain important questions about the external validity of the result. Like
any experiment, there are questions about the extent to which the observed behavior
is representative of actual behavior. There are also questions about how the treatment
is provided. What is the difference between actual duration of events—as observed by
a person—and the duration of the event that is given as a bite-size piece of informa-
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tion. Another concern is the difference between actual wars and hypothetical wars.
Previous research in conflict has heavily relied on hypothetical scenarios, because it is
possible to manipulate various aspects of the story.9 But we do not know how much
external validity is sacrificed to obtain ease of experimental manipulation. Further
research is needed in this area.
COIN Duration
A set of robustness checks are performed to verify the stability of the results
reported in Table 3.5. Table 3.6 reports one set of these results. Only the subset
of the data where the state is an occupier are reported. As before, the two types
of specifying a failure are reported next to each other. The table is estimated with
the assumption that the hazard rate has a Weibull distribution, and that there is
shared frailty (with a gamma distribution) among different observations of any given
state. The last column in the table is clearly misspecified, but reported here as an
alternative to a pair-wise correlation. The results are generally in agreement with our
theoretical expectation.
Table 3.7 provides a different set of results estimated with the assumption of
generalized gamma (and log-logistic) distributions. The reported coefficients in this
table are time ratios. For example, the first column means if we hold everything
constant, a state with w=1 fights wars that, on average, last 42% of the period of
wars that a similar state with w=0 fights.
9. For two examples of hypothetical war scenarios used in survey experiments see (Tomz 2007;
Trager and Vavreck 2011).
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Table 3.6: Robustness checks for the results on war duration. Higher w is associated with
shorter wars. Also, notice that the shape parameter is not significantly different from 1 (ln p
is not different from 0), meaning that if the assumption of the Weibull distribution holds,
the hazard rate does not have a monotonic trend.
Model III Model IV Model V
Variables/Failure any end loss/draw any end loss/draw any end loss/draw
w 4.052 8.716 2.522 2.040 1.351 1.392
(0.014) (0.043) (0.027) (0.187) (0.386) (0.452)
s 2.184 1.898
(0.374) (0.598)
power 1.108 0.921
(0.350) (0.649)
support=1 3.389 9.035
(0.002) (0.000)
support=2 1.308 1.684
(0.546) (0.398)
mech 0.780 0.832
(0.088) (0.353)
distance 0.786 0.800
(0.011) (0.089)
elevation 0.915 0.947
(0.377) (0.706)
wwii 0.580 0.799 1.378 2.666
(0.508) (0.863) (0.422) (0.032)
cold war 0.590 0.865 0.459 1.101
(0.173) (0.765) (0.005) (0.769)
Constant 0.063 0.007 0.017 0.006 0.022 0.010
(0.031) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Shape: ln p 0.986 1.085 0.945 0.975 0.928 0.950
(0.861) (0.524) (0.460) (0.811) (0.351) (0.619)
Frailty: ln θ 0.000 0.000 0.0606 0.000 0.116 0.000
(0.977) (0.987) (0.028) (0.983) (0.022) (0.988)
N (groups) 90 (21) 90 (21) 109 (21) 109 (21) 109 (21) 109 (21)
Wald χ2 27.11 22.26 9.695 4.729 0.751 0.569
log likelihood -140.9 -82.67 -177.9 -118 -182.3 -120.1
Reported coefficients are hazard ratios. All models use a Weibull distribution with shared frailty,
clustered on individual countries. Robust two-tailed p-values, obtained from standard errors clus-
tered on individual country codes, are reported in parentheses.
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Table 3.7: Robustness check for war duration results. Note that the coefficients are time
ratios. κ is estimated to be larger than 1 and not significantly different from 0, which
means the test does not help us understand the underlying distribution; it could be Weibull,
log-logistic, or something else.
Model VI Model VII Model VIII
Variables/Failure any end loss/draw any end loss/draw any end loss/draw
w 0.410 0.243 0.315 0.275 0.694 0.765
(0.049) (0.091) (0.009) (0.112) (0.223) (0.510)
S 0.403 0.589 0.933 1.623
(0.156) (0.680) (0.921) (0.468)
power 0.871 1.081
(0.074) (0.570)
support=1 0.425 0.190
(0.012) (0.000)
support=2 1.099 0.823
(0.772) (0.686)
distance 1.207 1.180
(0.007) (0.255)
elevation 1.057 1.006
(0.574) (0.955)
wwii 3.754 2.960 2.512 0.861
(0.005) (0.053) (0.033) (0.894)
cold war 2.613 1.665 3.253 0.901
(0.000) (0.146) (0.000) (0.842)
Constant 22.96 77.25 52.32 191.9 45.40 98.68
(0.002) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Shape: lnσ 1.108 1.172 1.036 1.229 1.259
(0.215) (0.011) (0.961) (0.000) (0.111)
Shape: κ 1.729 1.600 2.957 1.713 1.612
(0.233) (0.207) (0.502) (0.023) (0.207)
Shape: ln γ 0.772
(0.108)
N (clusters) 90 (21) 90 (21) 90 (21) 90 (21) 109 (21) 109 (21)
Log pseudo-lik -141.4 -85.91 -145.3 -91.43 -182.4 -119.4
generalized gamma × × × × ×
log-logistic ×
Reported coefficients are time ratios. Two-tailed p-values, calculated from robust standard errors
clustered on individual countries, are reported in parentheses. The second column is estimated using
the log-logistic distribution because the estimation using the generalized gamma distribution was
numerically not possible.
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CHAPTER IV
Why Not Try Harder?
4.1 Introduction
One of the recurring questions in the study of international conflict is why powerful
states lose to much less powerful adversaries. Even the best bets may lose from time
to time; the puzzle is that strong states, with all their modern weaponry, seem to
have become weaker, vis-à-vis their weakest enemies, compared to a century ago.
Democracies, in particular, seem poorly equipped to fight their weak adversaries.
Moreover, powerful states, especially democracies, sometimes fail to choose strategies
that are generally understood to lead to victory and instead opt for strategies that
are considered less effective (Mack 1975; Arreguin-Toft 2001; Sullivan 2007; Lyall and
Wilson III 2009). In this article, I present a model of military supply that provides
a parsimonious explanation for these patterns and intervenes in the debates about
democratic disadvantages in small wars.
The puzzles mentioned above are important, both because of their significant
policy link and because of their bearing on our understanding of implications of
democratic forms of government on international relations. It is, therefore, not sur-
prising that the topic has received much attention from students of international
security. There are at least three main lines of explanation offered for the observed
phenomena: explanations based on structural factors (including institutions), based
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on selection, and based on norms.
The first group of explanations put emphasis on institutions and other structural
factors. Mack (1975) famously argues that the balance of power is inversely related
to the balance of motivation, which leads to not winning wars by strong states due
to a lack in political support for wars. Others have contended that modern military
institutions are ill-equipped to fight small wars, either because of their slow adoption
of appropriate strategies, or because of their overemphasis on weapons and equipment
rather than human interaction with occupied peoples (Krepinevich 1986; Lyall and
Wilson III 2009). The second category of explanations focuses on selection effects.
Sullivan (2007) argues that powerful states sometimes relinquish victory because they
realize they are fighting wars they do not wish to fight, and conflicts with certain
objectives are more likely to lead to asymmetries of information and as a result
higher chances of such miscalculation. Hence, some types of wars are more likely to
be chosen poorly. The third group of explanations have focused on normative reasons
arguing that fighting small wars requires a levels of brutality that is prohibited by
democratic norms. Thus, democracies are not adept at fighting small wars while these
norms do not constrain their non-democratic opponents (Merom 2003).
Perhaps no single factor is going to fully explain the three interrelated puzzles
mentioned here and each of the existing theories may have some contribution, but
there are a number of ways that existing explanations encourage further work in this
area. First, much of the structural explanations assume somewhat irrational deci-
sions, or require the strong state to not learn from its past mistakes. For example,
why do armies, in the face of the knowledge about the importance of having human
contact with occupied populations, fail to provide that contact? Second, most of the
received explanations rely on a narrative that ignores the selection stage (the bar-
gaining phase), and the ones that are based on selection do not provide a satisfactory
answer for why these wars sometimes last very long. Arguments based on norms
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fail to account for significant episodes of international conflict by democratic states
(Reiter and Stam 2003, 149). It may be true that an atomic bomb would have “solved
the problem” in Vietnam, but it hardly follows that the American failure in Vietnam
was due to democratic values and norms. Moreover, there is a disagreement in the
literature about whether or not democratic states are weaker than other states when
they fight small wars (Merom 2003; Lyall 2010; Caverley 2014). Lyall points to a
major flaw in the literature: works studying the effect of democratic governance on
fighting insurgencies often limit their scope to democracies and do not allow variation
in their independent variables. Once this flaw is remedied, he finds little difference
between democracies and non-democracies.
I consider a simple crisis bargaining model, with the novel feature that military
power is assumed to have two components, weapons (or equipment) and soldiers; I
shall refer to these as capital and labor. These components are collected from the
public as taxes. The importance of each of these components is known for each
international crisis, but may be different from one crisis to another. A number of
hypotheses are obtained from the model. These hypotheses correspond well with
existing qualitative evidence and are corroborated with quantitative tests performed
here. Most importantly, I show that as the importance of labor increases, democ-
racies become weaker compared to non-democracies, but not necessarily in absolute
terms. That is, a change in the importance of labor affects democracies more than it
affects non-democracies. This presents a more nuanced understanding of the debate
about whether or not democracies are worse than non-democracies in fighting weak
adversaries. I present preliminary empirical evidence in support of this prediction.
The paper contributes to the continuing debates in the literature in a few ways.
The idea that military power has different components is not new, but this paper
presents the first model where the two basic components of military power are chosen
endogenously on a two-dimensional plane. Moreover, as mentioned, the model allows
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for a parsimonious explanation of why strong states perform worse in some wars,
why they fail to choose the optimal strategies, and why democracies are affected
more strongly with the type of war they face. Finally, the model also provides new
predictions that are borne out by empirical tests. In particular, it is predicted that
inequality leads to more capital intensive militaries in democracies and to more labor
intensive militaries in non-democracies, a limited test finds supporting evidence for
this hypothesis.
The paper is organized as follows: presentation of the theory and the model; a
study of the equilibrium outcomes of the model; a discussion of testable hypotheses
from the model; preliminary empirical results; and conclusions.
4.2 Capital and Labor
The fact that military forces have different components is perhaps as old as the
study of war, but it is often assumed that we can model military power along a single
dimension.1 In empirical studies, military power is usually measured with a fixed
combination of various factors such as national wealth, population, and the level
of economic development. The Correlates of War project provides the Composite
Index of National Capabilities (CINC), which is the most frequently used measure in
quantitative studies of militarized conflict (Singer and Small 1994).2 In the context of
asymmetric wars, Lyall and Wilson III (2009) use a distinction between “machine” and
soldiers to explain why modern militaries are not well-equipped to fight insurgencies.
Similarly, the distributional effects of where these components come from have been
used to explain the “new militarism” of democratic states (Bacevich 2013, Chapter
4). In a similar vein, Caverley (2014) presents what he coins “the cost distribution
1. For an early attempt in studying arming with the tools of modern economics see (Cooper and
Roll 1974).
2. There exist a minority of large-N studies of international conflict that look at components of
military power in studying various questions (Mintz and Huang 1991; Scheve and Stasavage 2012).
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theory,” based on the assumption that the median voter benefits from wars more than
they pay for it, and therefor encourage the state to engage in risky behavior.
Game theoretic models that include arming as a decision by one of the players
often have a guns-versus-butter tradeoff. Powell (1993) uses such a trade-off to study
the dynamics between two states in an anarchic international system. Bueno de
Mesquita et al. (1999) use such a trade-off to study states’ decision processes about
which wars to fight and how to fight them. This trade-off can be implicit in the
sunk costs of militarization (Slantchev 2005). Similarly, Caverley (2014, 56) relies on
a model where militarization happens in a single dimension. This presents a clear
gap between the theoretical claims about components of military power and existing
formal models.
I study the behavior of both democratic and non-democratic states in an asym-
metric war, meaning that the strong state faces a much weaker adversary, but over an
issue of marginal importance to the strong state. Following previous models, I assume
that victory is a public good and try to answer how much states take risks that may
escalate an existing crisis to war, and when war happens, how do they decide how
many soldiers to recruit and how much money to spend. In some wars, which side
wins a war heavily depends on which side has more weapons and better weapons,
while in other wars, it depends more heavily on the number of soldiers that each side
mobilizes.
The strong state is assumed to have two economic classes. Only the poorer class
contribute to the draft. In the extreme case, Russian serfs “owed” a military service
of twenty five years to the state in 1820’s (Bitis 2003), but even when there is a
universal draft in a democratic country, the distribution of soldiers is not uniform.3
3. When forced to join the military for one reason or another, sons of well-connected and well-
pocketed individuals rarely see danger. The existence of the so called “Champagne Units” lucidly
demonstrates this fact. Even in ancient times when the elite wanted to fight in wars, the likelihood
of getting killed was always much higher for the poor, who had less protection, were not mounted,
and had subpar weapons.
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Poutvaara and Wagener (2006) argue that draft is politically attractive because it
can be a targeted tax.
4.3 The Model
Suppose an international crisis happens between two sides and may escalate to
war. Suppose there is a considerable asymmetry of power and interest between the
two sides: Side A is a state and is much more powerful than side B, which may or
may not be a state; and the stakes have existential importance for B while they have
marginal importance for A. The goal is to develop a model of war with endogenous
military power for the strong side to study how states allocate their resources to
fighting asymmetric wars and how this allocation depends on domestic factors.
War ensues if the bargaining process—defined below—breaks down. Before war,
players have to decide about the makeup of their military. Since B is fighting for its
survival against a much stronger adversary, I assume that it is a unitary actor with a
fixed effort level, which means if a war happens, B’s military power is fixed.
Domestic setting
Assume that State A has N citizens and that citizens are partitioned into elites
(E) and masses (M).4 All the masses and all the elite are supposed to have the same
preferences, so the game has three players: E (the elite in A), M (the masses in A),
and B, which is assumed to be a unitary actor.
The elite constitute λ share of the society, where λ < 1/2, so that they are the
minority. The elite earn (1 + r) times more than the masses, yE = (1 + r)yM . To
fix the state income while allowing for inequality to vary, it is easier to work with
the mean per capita income which is y¯ = (1 + rλ)yM , and then define yM , and yE as
4. The domestic setup used here is based on Acemoglu and Robinson’s models of democratic
transition. See (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, 2006).
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functions of r and y¯. Further assume that the elite are exempt from military service,
but they are sensitive to casualties with a factor of φ, where φ ∈ [0, 1].
To build an army, the state collects two types of taxes: income tax and draft. Let
τ and β denote the corresponding tax rates such that the army has Captial (K) and
Labor (L) as follows  K = τNy¯L = βN(1− λ) (4.1)
In the event of an imminent war, if A is democratic, I assume that the masses, who
are the deciding block in elections, decide (τ, β). If A is not democratic, the elite
determine tax rates.
War
I use a take-it-or-leave-it bargaining model of conflict as follows.5 This assumes
that information asymmetry between the two sides is the potential cause of bargaining
failure. The bargain is over a prize worth v, and if A’s offer is rejected by B, war
happens. The winner of the war takes the whole prize. In line with previous work, I
assume that the prize of war—or a share of it—is a public good.6
If war happens, both sides pay a cost regardless of whether or not they win and
the winner gets the entire prize, v. For B, the cost of fighting is cB, which has a
twice differentiable cumulative distribution function FcB(c) on the range of [cB, cB];
suppose fcB(c) is the probability density function of cB.
The cost of war for citizens of A are the capital and the human costs. The capital
cost is paid through the capital tax which is τyi. Let Ψ denote a measure of human
5. See (Fearon 1995) for a prominent use of this bargaining mechanism. The take-it-or-leave-it
bargaining mechanism is attractive because of its simplicity, and allows me to focus on the question
at hand. A bevy of variations of the bargaining protocol have been studied in the literature; see
(Fey and Ramsay 2011; Slantchev and Tarar 2011) for a recent dialogue and (Powell 2002) for a
review of earlier work.
6. The assumption that the stakes of a war are public goods is not challenging if we think of them
as security, a shared sense of pride, economic opportunities, etc. In making this assumption I am
following the work of Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999).
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Eoffer (x, 1− x)
accept
B
reject
M (in democracies) or
E (in non-democracies)
choose (τ, β)
Nature
B wins A wins
Figure 4.1: Order of player of the game. In democracies, tax rates are chosen by the
masses (M) and in non-democracies, they are chosen by the elite (E).
cost of war so that the ex ante expected cost of war is βΨ for the masses and φβΨ
for the elite. The simplest way of interpreting β and Ψ is to think β is the chance of
being drafted and Ψ is the expected human cost for a soldier. But we can also think
that Ψ is capturing all the human cost of war: being drafted, getting killed, having a
relative who is drafted or killed, etc.
The order of play is as follows. The elite in A, the strong side, offer a division
of the disputed prize to B. The division is (xv, (1 − x)v), where v is the prize and
x ∈ [0, 1] is the share that A keeps for itself. B can accept or reject the offer. If B
accepts the offer, the division goes through and war is avoided. In this case, citizens
of A each get xv + yi where yi is their own income (which is either yM or yE), and B
gets (1 − x)v. Everything about A is common knowledge, but A does not know B’s
cost of fighting. The model is depicted in Figure 4.1.
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Production function
The model is based on the assumption that the strong side chooses how much to
invest in the war effort but the weak side makes an utmost effort. The capital and the
number of soldiers on the strong side are translated into the probability of winning
using a production function that is increasing in each component and has diminishing
marginal returns.
To get analytical traction, I rely on the following adaptation of the Cobb-Douglas
production function. A’s military power is
power(K,L) = max{αKaLb − 1, 0} (4.2)
where K and L are capital and labor, α > 0 is a coefficient, and a > 0 and b > 0
depend on the type of war. Normalizing B’s power to 1, and following the convention
that probability of winning is one side’s power divided by total power, the probability
of winning the war by A is
pi(K,L) =
power(K,L)
power(K,L) + 1
= max
{
1− 1
αKaLb
, 0
}
. (4.3)
Finally, to obtain comparative statics as the type of war changes, let us define d =
a+ b, and assume d is fixed so that taking derivatives with respect to b becomes more
meaningful.
4.4 Analysis
In this section, I find the equilibrium values of parameters and then use them to
study a number of comparative statics. We are interested in a number of outcomes
and how their equilibrium values change: how much does State A invest in each
component? How likely is State A to win the war? And how hawkish does State A
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act (i.e., the size of the offer)? We want to find the difference between these outcomes
in democracies and non-democracies, how they change as the income gap between the
elite and the masses, how they change as the relative importance of soldiers compared
to capital increases, and how they change as the human cost (sensitivity to casualties)
increases.
Subgame Perfect Equilibria
We can use backwards induction to find the subgame perfect equilibria of the
model. Let wi denote the expected payoff to each player i in the event of war. We
have
WM = pi
∗v − (1− τ ∗)YM − β∗Ψ (4.4)
WE = pi
∗v − (1− τ ∗)YE − β∗φΨ (4.5)
WB = (1− pi∗)v − cB (4.6)
Throughout this chapter, asterisks are used to indicate equilibrium values of param-
eters. Here, τ ∗ and β∗ are known, which also determine pi∗, because A’s information
is public knowledge.
Suppose that A’s offer in the bargaining phase is rejected by B, so that war is
going to happen. Optimal tax rates should satisfy the following first order conditions,
where i denotes the player who sets the tax rates, i.e., M in democracies and E in
non-democracies.
g1 :
∂Wi
∂τ
= 0 (4.7)
g2 :
∂Wi
∂β
= 0
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In democracies, the first-order conditions are
g1 : ατy¯(τ y¯N)
a(β(1− λ)N)b − av(1 + λr) = 0, (4.8)
g2 : αβΨ(τ y¯N)
a(β(1− λ)N)b − bv = 0.
and in non-democracies, the first-order conditions are
g1 : α(1 + r)τ y¯(τ y¯N)
a(β(1− λ)N)b − av(1 + λr) = 0, (4.9)
g2 : αβφΨ(τ y¯N)
a(β(1− λ)N)b − bv = 0.
The second order conditions are always satisfied, because in both democratic and
non-democratic states, the second derivatives are obtained as follows:
∂2Wi
∂τ 2
= −a(a+ 1)vK
−aL−b
ατ 2
< 0
∂2Wi
∂β2
= −b(b+ 1)vK
−aL−b
αβ2
< 0.
Therefore, there is a unique set of tax rates that will be chosen if war should happen.7
These tax rates are known to all players. Thus, in the bargaining phase, if A proposes
(x, 1 − x) to B, B will accept the proposition if (1 − x)v > (1 − pi∗)v − cB. Let us
define c˜B as the threshold that makes B indifferent between accepting and rejecting
an offer, i.e., c˜B(x) = v(x− pi∗). The elite’s total expected payoff from choosing x is
UE(x) = FcB(c˜B(x))W
∗
E +
(
1− FcB(c˜B(x))
)
(xv + yE). (4.10)
7. The optimal tax rates might not be an interior solution, but given the qualitative assumptions
about the “asymmetric war,” numerical values of parameters are substantively meaningful only when
there are interior solutions for tax rates: both tax rates are bigger than 0 and less than 1, and victory
is neither impossible nor guaranteed.
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Hence, the elite’s equilibrium choice should be a member of
X∗ = arg max
x∈[0,1]
UE(x) (4.11)
The optimal choices of τ and β are not affected by whether or not X∗ has only a single
member (i.e., whether or not (4.11) has multiple solutions); but to study comparative
statics of the equilibrium value of the offer, let us assume that (4.11) has one solution,
to which we shall refer as x∗, and x∗ ∈ (0, 1). We are assuming uniqueness of x∗ for
convenience in analysis and simplicity in presentation, but it is worth highlighting
that this is not a demanding assumption: indeed, the most widely used distributions
of cost in the literature, namely, the uniform and the exponential distributions, are
guaranteed to result in a unique solution for (4.11).
The interior solution of the offer should satisfy the first and second order condi-
tions:
1− FcB(c˜B(x∗))− fcB(c˜B(x∗)) (x∗v + yE −W ∗E) = 0,
− 2vfcB(c˜B(x∗))− vf ′cB(c˜B(x∗)) (x∗v + yE −W ∗E) < 0.
Putting these conditions together implies
2fcB(c˜B(x
∗))2 ≥ − (1− FcB(c˜B(x∗))) f ′cB(c˜B(x∗)).
We can assume this constraint to hold for all values of c ∈ [cB, cB], i.e.,
∀c ∈ [cB, cB] : 2fcB(c)2 ≥ − (1− FcB(c)) f ′cB(c). (4.12)
It has to be highlighted that the uniform and exponential distributions satisfy (4.12).8
8. The uniform distribution satisfies (4.12) because it has f ′(.) = 0. Also, solving fcB (c)2 =
− (1− FcB (c)) f ′cB (c) yields an exponential distribution with arbitrary shift and rate and solving
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Army Buildup
To see how the optimal tax rates change as the income gap grows, we can take
implicit derivatives and use Cramer’s rule as follows:
∂τ ∗
∂r
= −
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂g1/∂r ∂g1/β
∂g2/∂r ∂g2/β
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂g1/∂τ ∂g1/∂β
∂g2/∂τ ∂g2/∂β
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
,
∂β∗
∂r
= −
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂g1/∂τ ∂g1/∂r
∂g2/∂τ ∂g2/∂r
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂g1/∂τ ∂g1/∂β
∂g2/∂τ ∂g2/∂β
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(4.13)
In the democratic setting, (4.13) gives
∂τ ∗
∂r
=
α(b+ 1)λτ 2y¯KaLb
av(a+ b+ 1)(1 + λr)2
> 0, (4.14)
∂β∗
∂r
= − αβλτ y¯K
aLb
v(a+ b+ 1)(1 + λr)2
< 0,
and in the non-democratic setting, (4.13) results in
∂τ ∗
∂r
= −α(b+ 1)(1− λ)τ
2y¯KaLb
av(a+ b+ 1)(1 + λr)2
< 0, (4.15)
∂β∗
∂r
=
αβ(1− λ)τ y¯KaLb
v(a+ b+ 1)(1 + λr)2
> 0.
Note that the results do not depend on φ or Ψ. The following proposition is the result
of (4.14) and (4.15).
Proposition 4.1. In a democracy, as the income gap between the elite and the
masses widens, the army takes more capital and recruits fewer soldiers; in non-
democracies, regardless of elite sensitivity to casualties, as the income gap grows,
the army takes less capital and recruits more soldiers.
Using the chain rule similar to (4.13), we have the following comparative statics
2fcB (c)
2 = − (1− FcB (c)) f ′cB (c) yields a Cauchy distribution for B’s cost.
81
with respect to b. In both democracies and non-democracies we obtain
∂τ ∗
∂b
=
τ (ln (K)− ln(L))
d+ 1
− τ
a
, (4.16)
∂β∗
∂b
=
β (ln (K)− ln(L))
(d+ 1)
+
β
b
(4.17)
The first fractions in both expressions are positive if K∗ > L∗, so this is a sufficient
condition for ∂β
∂b
> 0, but ∂τ
∂b
can be positive or negative. If, however, the parameters
are such that K∗ is much larger than L∗, then an increase in the importance of labor
and decrease in the importance of capital will still result in an increased capital tax
rate as well as an increase in the rate of draft.
We can use (4.8) and (4.9) to compare the differences between democracies and
non-democracies, in terms of their tax rates and also their chance of winning a war
in equilibrium. The ratios of equilibrium values of the parameters of democracies
(denoted by subscript D) to non-democracies (denoted by subscript ND) are
τD
τND
= 1+a+b
√
(r + 1)1+b
φb
(4.18)
βD
βND
= 1+a+b
√
φ1+a
(r + 1)a
Importantly, compared to non-democracies, democracies always tax more and draft
less.
Chance of Victory
There are various ways in which we can define “democratic advantage”, but one
which provides much algebraic ease is the ratio between the probability of failure of
nondemocracies to the probability of failure of democracies. Let η denote democratic
advantage defined in this way, i.e., η = 1−pi
∗
ND
1−pi∗D . Note that η is, by definition, always
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positive. Using (4.8) and (4.9) we find
η = 1+a+b
√
(1 + r)aφb.
Keeping d constant, we have limb→d− η = φ and limb→0+ η = 1 + r, so that for wars
in which power depends only on capital, democracies perform better and for wars in
which power depends only on labor, non-democracies perform better . Taking the
derivative of η with respect to b (while keeping d constant), we obtain9
∂η
∂b
=
η (ln(φ)− ln(r + 1))
1 + a+ b
< 0. (4.19)
The next proposition summarizes the results of (4.18) and (4.19).
Proposition 4.2. Holding everything except regime type constant, in equilibrium,
a democracy always recruits fewer soldiers and spends more capital for the military
compared to a non-democracy. Consequently, as the importance of labor increases
compared to the importance of capital, the democratic advantage is reduced and may
turn into a disadvantage.
How does the likelihood of victory change as b changes? In both democracies and
non-democracies we obtain
∂pi∗
∂b
=
(1− pi∗) (ln(L)− ln(K))
d+ 1
.
The necessary and sufficient condition for dpi∗
db
< 0 is K > L, which is satisfied in any
realistic set of parameters. Note that ∂pi∗
∂b
< 0 is always more negative for democracies
(compared to exactly similar non-democracies) because they always have a higher
capital tax and lower draft rate.
9. We obtain the same result, i.e., ∂η∂b < 0, whether or not we keep a+ b constant.
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Proposition 4.3. If K > L, as the importance of labor increases and the impor-
tance of capital decreases, both democracies and non-democracies are going to have
lower chances of victory.
In democratic and nondemocratic settings, respectively, we obtain the following
comparative statics for how the likelihood of victory changes as the income gap be-
tween the masses and the elite changes.
democracies:
∂pi∗
∂r
=
λτ y¯
v(a+ b+ 1)(1 + λr)2
> 0, (4.20)
non-democracies:
∂pi∗
∂r
= − (1− λ)τ y¯
v(a+ b+ 1)(1 + λr)2
< 0. (4.21)
Again, note that this result holds regardless of the values of the parameters, i.e., it
holds so long as there is an interior solution to the optimization problem of the tax
rates (4.7).
Proposition 4.4. In a democracy, as the income gap between the elite and the
masses increases, the army becomes more likely to win the war; in a non-democracy,
higher income inequality leads to lower chances of victory.
Size of the Offer
To study how the size of the offer, i.e., 1−x, changes as other parameters change,
I use monotone comparative statics to derive results without assuming a specific
distribution of B’s cost, cB.10
At the outset, the elite’s expected payoff is UE(.)—as obtained from (4.10). As-
10. Monotone comparative statics comprise a family of powerful techniques for obtaining compar-
ative statics using qualitative assumptions about complementarity of arguments. For original work,
see (Topkis 1978; Milgrom and Shannon 1994), and for a tutorial on the use of these techniques in
political science applications see (Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2006).
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suming that all parameters except r are fixed we have
∂2UE
∂r∂x
= vfcB
(
c˜B(x)
)(∂W ∗E
∂r
+ v
∂pi∗
∂r
)
+ v2
(
vx+ yE −W ∗E
)
f ′cB
(
c˜B(x)
)∂pi∗
∂r
(4.22)
With some rearrangement and using (4.12), we obtain ∂
2UE
∂r∂x
< 0, which means U(x, r)
is supermodular and implies the following proposition.
Proposition 4.5. As the income inequality grows, states become more generous
(i.e., demand less) in the bargaining phase.
Similarly, with respect to b we have
∂2UE
∂b∂x
= vfcB
(
c˜B(x)
)(∂W ∗E
∂b
+ v
∂pi∗
∂b
)
+ v2
(
vx+ yE −W ∗E
)
f ′cB
(
c˜B(x)
)∂pi∗
∂b
(4.23)
In non-democracies, simplifying (4.23) using (4.12), and assuming K > L, we ob-
tain ∂
2UE
∂b∂x
< 0. In democracies, however, K > L is not a sufficient condition for
supermodularity of UE with respect to x and b. This gives the following proposition.
Proposition 4.6. As the importance of labor increases and the importance of cap-
ital decreases, non-democracies become more generous (i.e., demand less) in the bar-
gaining phase, but democratic states may become more or less generous.
In the model, the bargaining phase is carried out by the elite, even in democracies.
But what is the difference between the position of the masses and the elite before the
war breaks out? Do the masses want to appease the enemy more or less than the
elite? Let us assume that cB is distributed uniformly over [cB, cB]. Remember that x∗
is the share of the prize that A wants to keep for herself, so higher x∗ means a more
hawkish bargaining position. We denote the difference between the position of the
elite and the masses as ∆x∗ = x∗M − x∗E. The elite’s equilibrium value of x, obtained
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from solving (4.11) with a uniform distribution, is
x∗E =
1
2v
(cB + 2pi
∗v − τ ∗yE − β∗φΨ).
Now, suppose that instead of the elite, the masses had the power to propose a settle-
ment in the bargaining phase; they would maximize their own payoff:
UM(x) = FcB(c˜B(x))W
∗
M +
(
1− FcB(c˜B(x))
)
(xv + yM).
Solving arg maxUM(x) yields
x∗M =
1
2v
(cB + 2pi
∗v − τ ∗yM − β∗Ψ).
We find ∆x∗ = (τ ∗yMr − β∗(1 − φ)Ψ)/2v. In democracies, optimal tax rates satisfy
(4.8), which implies
∆x∗
D
=
1− pi∗
2
(
ar − b(1− φ))
In non-democracies, optimal tax rates satisfy (4.9), which implies
∆x∗
ND
=
1− pi∗
2
( ar
r + 1
− b(1− φ)
φ
)
In democracies, the necessary and sufficient condition for the masses being more
hawkish than the elite is:
ar > b(1− φ). (4.24)
In non-democracies, this condition is:11
arφ > b(1− φ)(r + 1). (4.25)
11. To obtain (4.24) and (4.25), we assumed cB is distributed uniformly. Interestingly, we find
constraints that are exactly similar to these if we assume an exponential distribution of B’s costs.
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Remember that r > 0 and φ < 1. In democracies, if the gap between the rich and the
poor is large enough, i.e., r > b/a, the masses become more hawkish than the elite
regardless of φ. But, in non-democracies, if φ < b/a, the elite are more hawkish than
the masses.
Sensitivity to Casualties
How do the quantities of interest change as sensitivity to casualties changes? We
find that in both democracies and non-democracies
∂τ ∗
∂Ψ
=
αβτ(β(1− λ)N)b (Nτy¯)a
v(a+ b+ 1)
, (4.26)
∂β∗
∂Ψ
= −(a+ 1)αβ
2(β(1− λ)N)b (Nτy¯)a
bv(a+ b+ 1)
. (4.27)
As expected ∂τ∗
∂Ψ
> 0 and ∂β
∗
∂Ψ
< 0. Also, in democracies
∂pi∗
∂Ψ
= − β
av + bv + v
and in non-democracies
∂pi∗
∂Ψ
= − βφ
av + bv + v
,
Finally, in both democracies and non-democracies, similar to (4.22), ∂
2UE
∂Ψ∂x
< 0. These
results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.7. As the cost of casualties increases, both democracies and non-
democracies will increase their capital tax and decrease their draft rate, and will be-
come weaker overall, which also results in their more generous bargaining positions.
Discussion
The comparative static predictions of the model paint a more complicated picture
than what a guns-versus-butter or a non-strategic account of funding for armed forces
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would provide us. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to make intuitive sense of the results.
In democracies, because of the influence of poor voters, there is always more emphasis
on capital and less emphasis on labor, compared to non-democracies that are identical
in other parameters. As the gap between the rich and the poor grows, democracies
will recruit even fewer soldiers and tax more capital, but the overall result will be
more powerful armies, meaning higher chances of victory. For non-democracies, the
opposite is true: as the income gap grows, they rely more on labor and less on capital,
and the overall effect is weaker militaries.
Wars with much weaker adversaries often involves strategies that require more
manpower. When the importance of soldiers vis-à-vis capital increases, there will be
a larger draft; but the effect on capital tax can be positive or negative depending
on other parameters. If the parameters are such that the military is really capital-
intensive (i.e., K >> L), an increase in the importance of labor leads to not only a
larger draft, but also a greater tax on capital.
Importantly, democracies are better than non-democracies when military power is
determined more heavily by capital, but democracies lose this advantage as the nature
of the war becomes such that the importance of capital is reduced and the importance
of labor is increased. It is important to note that the comparison between democracies
and non-democracies is valid in a difference-in-difference sense: democratic advantage
is the difference between their respective likelihoods of victory, and we are predicting
that democratic advantage goes down as the importance of labor goes up.
Also, as the nature of the prospective war shifts such that soldiers become more
important and capital becomes less important, non-democracies become more lenient
in the bargaining phase, but the effect on the bargaining position of democracies
depends on other factors. In the model, it is assumed that bargaining is always
performed by the elite, but they look down the game tree and know how powerful their
army is going to be. In both democracies and non-democracies, larger income gaps
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result in less hawkish stances by the elite in the bargaining phase. In democracies,
this happens because the elite are going to contribute more toward the war effort; in
non-democracies, this happens because the elite are going to contribute less and make
a weaker army. The overall effect is that the elite take lower risks as they become
richer compared to the rest of the society.
Finally, let us take a more critical look at the model. First, the model is based on
a dichotomy between capital and labor. We are certain that this is a false dichotomy:
at a minimum, we know soldiers also need to be paid. Nonetheless, the question is
whether or not this is a useful simplification and my contention is that it is. Second,
the driving force behind the dynamics that we see are the differences between the
elite and the masses. There are two differences: the elite have a higher income and
incur a lower human cost (e.g., they are exempt from the draft). Both of these are
parameterized so in the extreme—i.e., r = 0 and φ = 1—the elite and the masses are
indistinguishable. The income difference seems to be more important in arriving at
our qualitative predictions than the difference in human costs; for example, it can be
seen that hardly any result changes substantively if we assume φ = 1, whereas this is
not true for the income difference.12 It is clear that the results obtained here partly
depend on the specific production function used.
4.5 Empirical Results
In this section, empirical tests of two of the main predictions of the model are
presented. The first one looks at democratic advantage in different wars and the
second test is about how arming decisions are affected by regime type and income
inequality. Another piece of empirical evidence, which looks at the relationship be-
tween citizens’ support for increasing troops in the Iraq war and income is presented
12. The empirical tests of the model are also interesting because empirical studies have not cor-
roborated the expected dynamics in a uni-dimensional tax rate (Mulligan, Sala-i-Martin, and Gil
2003) as predicted by Meltzer and Richard (1981).
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in Appendix IV.A. This last test is not about a prediction of the model, but about
one of the key assumptions of the model: people with lower income support support
more capital-intensive armies.
Democratic Advantage
Proposition 4.2 tells us that as the type of war shifts in a way that makes capital
more important and labor less important, we should expect democratic states to lose
their advantage over non-democratic states.
Ideally, we would want data that cover wars between adversaries with varying
levels of power, and measures for a and b which tell us how relevant military power
depends on capital and labor. In the absence of the ideal data, I use data from the
Correlates of War project (Singer and Small 1994). To remedy the lack of measures
for a and b, I use the balance of state power as a proxy for the strategies that are
going to be used. As stated before, when strong states face much weaker adversaries,
they are more likely to face guerrilla war tactics. Therefore, we expect democratic
advantage to go down as the adversaries become weaker.
War is the unit of analysis, and the data are rearranged to accommodate the
assumption of the model that State A is the stronger side. Each war appears in
the data once for the originators of the conflict (and not “joiners”).13 The dependent
variable in the analyses, wdl, is an ordinal variable showing whether State A won the
war, ended the war with a draw, or lost it. This is interesting for us, but ultimately
we are interested in a difference-in-difference measure which will be calculated in post
estimation of our models. I use ordered logistic regression, which is the most widely
used model in the literature for trichotomous war outcomes (Stam 1999; Downes
2009; Lyall 2010).
The main explanatory variable for this analysis is the interaction between state
13. Version 3.204 of EUGene was used to produce the data set; for details of EUGene and COW
refer to (Bennett and Stam 2000) and (Singer and Small 1994).
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capacity and democracy. For state capacity I use cinc, as provided in the COW data
and generate the balance of national capacities as follows: bonc = cincAcincA+cincB . For
the measure of democracy, I use polity, which is a measure of democracy ranging
from −10, most dictatorial, to +10, most democratic (Marshall and Jaggers 2011).14
The analysis is performed on the data from both 1816-2001 and the post-World
War II era. COW provides data on various hostility levels which range from 1 (no
militarized action) to 5 (a war with a total of at least 1000 battle deaths in a period of
one year).15 The analysis is performed on militarized interstate disputes with hostility
levels equal or greater than 4 (use of military force). The analysis is also performed
exclusively on hostility level of 5.
A number of other explanatory variables, beside polity for both sides and the
interaction of the polity score of Side A and bonc, are included in the analysis
which are explained as follow.16 revision is a categorical variable which is included
in the analysis as a set of dichotomous variables that show the goal of war. kA,
kB, lA, and lB are capital and labor for A and B, respectively; these are military
expenditure (in thousands US dollars, milex) and military personnel (in thousands
of people, milper) for each side. In some models I control for ln(k/l) for each side
instead of controlling for each component separately. peaceyears is the number
of peace years between the two sides before the start of the dispute. Finally, init
indicates whether or not Side A initiated the dispute. All the variables are obtained
from the COW data through EUGene.
The results of the ordered logit estimations are presented in Table 4.1. Models 4.1,
4.2 and 4.4 have the same specification but are estimated with different samples: 4.1
is estimated on the entire sample, 4.2 is estimated using the post-WWII subset of the
14. More accurately, the updated ‘polity2’ score is used. The analysis can be done with a dichoto-
mous measure of democracy without much change.
15. See Sarkees and Schafer (2000) for more details on COW data.
16. Models presented here include polityA × bonc; including polityB × bonc does not change
the results and only makes interpretation (with two interactions) more difficult.
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Table 4.1: Ordinal logit results showing that democratic states have an advantage when
they fight strong opponents but their advantage diminishes as they face weaker opponents.
The dependent variable is wdl (win, draw, loss) for the strong state.
Model 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4
Variable / Sample Full Sample Post WWII Full Sample Wars
polityA 0.138 0.167 0.135 0.160
(0.056) (0.087) (0.057) (0.245)
polityB -0.014 -0.003 -0.014 0.014
(0.012) (0.018) (0.012) (0.047)
polityA × bonc -0.163 -0.174 -0.155 -0.085
(0.069) (0.109) (0.070) (0.301)
bonc 0.188 1.338 -0.012 0.731
(0.569) (0.888) (0.880) (2.270)
ln(kA/lA) 0.106 -0.113 -0.014
(0.062) (0.115) (0.290)
ln(kB/lB) 0.092 -0.004 -0.257
(0.060) (0.110) (0.322)
lnkA -0.011
(0.078)
ln lA 0.072
(0.111)
lnkB 0.060
(0.081)
ln lB -0.083
(0.096)
init 0.353 0.260 0.322 0.833
(0.169) (0.264) (0.171) (0.719)
peaceyears 0.008 0.025 0.008 0.021
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.026)
coldwar 0.195 -0.684 0.739
(0.182) (0.329) (0.711)
year 0.011
(0.004)
Observations 1,189 917 1,174 59
Log-Likelihood -639.1 -288.5 -628.5 -54.68
Wald χ2 (df) 53.01 (12) 33.38 (12) 59.69 (14) 15.85 (12)
Prob χ2 4.11× 10−7 8× 10−4 1.33× 10−7 0.198
–Constants and fixed effects for revision type (territory, policy, regime change, other)
are included in all models but suppressed in the table.
–Standard errors are reported in parentheses
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sample, and 4.4 is estimated on a subsample that only includes wars (only hostility
levels of 5 are included). Model 4.3 is only different in that it includes a number
of other control variables. Theoretically, we expect the interaction of polityA and
bonc to be negative, which is the case in all models. In model 4.4, however, the
interaction is not statistically significant. It is important that the statistical signifi-
cance of this interaction may be misleading. We are interested in the marginal effect
of polityA for various values of bonc, and not able to directly make sense of the
numbers reported in Table 4.1.
Before we interpret the size and meaning of the coefficients in Table 4.1, note
that Model 4.4 performs very poorly; there is roughly a 20% chance that we get the
same level of predictive power from noise. This is, in part, the result of a far smaller
sample than other estimations (59 versus 1189). Still, for a well-specified model, 59
observations are not too few. Remember that the explanatory variables for military
expenditure and military personnel are not those that are allocated to the war; they
are national levels of military capacity. When we are studying military engagements
that are stopped early, focusing on general military capacity (as opposed to deployed
forces) is reasonable. When a militarized dispute rises to the level of war, however,
there is more information regarding military mobilization, draft, and deployment
specifically for that war. As such, it is harder to justify the use of national-level
capabilities for our empirical studies when we only look at wars.
Figure 4.2 shows the difference between the likelihood of winning (i.e., wdl=1) for
a fully democratic state (polityA = 10) and a fully non-democratic state (polityA =
−10) at different levels of bonc; other explanatory variables are left at their means
except revision which is set to regime. The shadow shows 95% confidence intervals
and is obtained through bootstrapping. The figure shows that democracies have a
sizable advantage—over non-democracies—in fighting powerful adversaries, but their
advantage shrinks as the adversaries become weaker. In the figure, for adversaries that
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are roughly equal in power, democracies are 16% more likely than non-democracies
to win; for adversaries whose national capacity is 1/100 of the powerful state, democ-
racies are on average 6% less likely to win.
Figure 4.2 provides a hint about why some studies have failed to see a difference
between democracies and non-democracies in fighting small wars: while democratic
advantage is positive and statistically significant for lower values of bonc, it is not
significant for higher values of bonc.
The model suggests that we should look for the difference-in-difference measure.
This is another way to interpret estimations reported in Table 4.1 by taking the
difference between democratic advantage for low values of bonc (relatively equally
powerful adversary) and comparing it to democratic advantage in high values of bonc
(much weaker adversary). The results are reported in Table 4.2. DID shows the
difference in difference estimation: the difference in the likelihood of victory between
a democracy and a non-democracy (polity scores of +10 and −10) when balance
of state capacity goes from 1
2
to 100
101
(from equal state capacity to having 100 times
more state capacity). For predictions, coldwar = 0 and all other variables are set
at their means. Standard errors are obtained from bootstrapping.
The results warrant some skepticism both because of the leap from the theory
to the empirical evidence—using measures of national armed forces in lieu of actual
troops and capital dedicated to the conflict—and (possibly, as a result of this short-
coming) there was no statistically significant finding for militarized disputes that
COW has coded as war. Nonetheless, the results corroborate the theoretical ex-
pectation that the “democratic advantage” is attenuated and may even turn into a
disadvantage when the powerful side faces a much less powerful adversary.
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Table 4.2: Difference in difference estimations: the difference in the likelihood of victory
between a democracy and a non-democracy (polity scores of +10 and −10).
Model Revision Type DID (Std. Error)
4.1 Territory -0.147 (0.076)
4.1 Policy -0.071 (0.037)
4.1 Regime -0.189 (0.109)
4.1 Other -0.105 (0.055)
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The Effect of Inequality
One of the new predictions of the model is how inequality affects military buildup.
As Proposition 4.1 suggested, the model predicts that higher economic inequality
leads to more capital intensive militaries in democracies, and to less capital-intensive
militaries in non-democracies for fighting asymmetric wars.
Because of data availability problems, I test this hypothesis using total military
expenditure and personnel for each country. The unit of analysis is country-year.
For each observation, as before, k and l show military expenditure (in thousands of
US dollars) and military personnel (in thousands of people), which correspond to K
(capital) and L (labor) components of power in the model. As the dependent variable,
two different measures are used. The first one is a simple ratio: κ = ln
(
k
l
)
. Figure
4.3 shows the distribution of κ. Another way is to use the balance of k and l for each
country by measuring how much of their power comes from each. For this purpose we
must first make the scales comparable. Let us divide each component by its average
in all the available observations (denoted by a bar) and then let κ˜ denote the balance
of components. We have
κ˜ = ln
(
l× k
l× k+ k× l
)
.
As a measure of democracy, I use the polity score;17 For income gap between the
rich and the poor, I use the Gini coefficient, as measured by the World Bank. Gini is
theoretically bound between 0 and 1; higher values show more inequality. In our data,
Gini is measured in percentage and ranges from 16.23 to 74.33. Unfortunately, Gini
is available only very sparsely. All the tests performed here are performed twice: once
on the available data, and once more after imputing Gini (and also Gross National
Income, which also has some missing values) 100 times and averaging over results
and correcting for the ambiguity resulting from variability in the imputation.18 Other
17. Using w from the selectorate theory yields similar results.
18. World Bank data are obtained from the World Development Indicators by using the WDI tools
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Figure 4.3: Kernel density of κ before imputation. The figure is drawn with a bandwith
of 0.222.
variables used in the analysis come from the Correlates of War project and compiled
by EUGene. The intersection of the available data ranges from 1960 to 2001.
The theoretical prediction is that higher Gini should lead to higher values of κ
in democracies and to lower values of κ in non-democracies. Accordingly, our main
explanatory variable is Gini × polity, and we are interested in the marginal effect
of Gini on κ at different levels of polity. The model used here is
κi,t = β1Ginii,t + β2Ginii,t × polityi,t + β3polityi,t +
∑
j
bjxj,i,t + αi + i,t ,
where i and t indicate country and year, xjs are other explanatory variables and
αis are country fixed effects. One set of explanatory variables used are indicators
of maximum hostility levels. For each country-year, hostility is 0 if the country
did not have any militarized interstate dispute in that year, or the maximum level
of hostility that the county experienced in that year. The variable ranges from 0
in R (Arel-Bundock 2013). For multiple imputations see (Rubin 1996).
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(no militarized conflict) to 5 (war).19 We also control for population and Gross
National Product, gni, as they probably affect how each country allocates resources
to its military and are correlated with our main explanatory variables. Finally, the
results reported here are obtained from models including country fixed effects. This
makes the estimation less likely to suffer from omitted variable bias and also helps
with temporal independence of observations. Doing the analysis with regional fixed
effects produces similar results, but without fixed effects, the results are brittle and
easily change depending on small changes in the specification of the model.
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show the results of the analysis using the original and imputed
data, respectively. Models 4.5 and 4.9 use κ as the dependent variable; Models 4.6
and 4.10 use κ˜ as the dependent variable. These models show substantively strong—
interpretation is presented below—and statistically significant positive values for the
interaction of Gini and polity. An alternative set of tests is also presented where
the dependent variable is k or l (Models 4.7, 4.8, 4.11 and 4.12). Again, in line with
the prediction of Proposition 4.1, we see positive coefficients for the interaction of
Gini and polity when the dependent variable is military expenditure and negative
coefficients when the dependent variable is military personnel.
Interpretation of the results of our estimation requires calculating marginal ef-
fects of Gini. Figure 4.4 shows the marginal effect of Gini on κ for different values
of polity for the original and the imputed data (based on Models 4.5 and 4.9).
The intercept in the two marginal effects are different: The original data show neg-
ative and significant effects for Gini in non-democracies and no significant effect for
it in democracies, while the imputed data show no significant effects for Gini in
non-democracies and positive and significant significant effect for it in democracies.
Despite this difference, the substantive interpretation is essentially the same.
Intuitive interpretation of the results of Tables 4.3 and 4.4 are difficult even with
19. This is the maximum ‘hostility’ value reported for each country in each year in Correlates of
War data.
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Table 4.3: Ordinary least squares regressions on the original data using different dependent
variables. k and l are measures of military expenditure and military personnel. κ and κ˜
are the raw and normalized versions of ln(k/l).
Model 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8
Variables κ κ˜ ln(k) ln(l)
Gini -0.0153 -0.0110 -0.0119 0.00641
(0.00873) (0.00657) (0.00849) (0.00638)
Gini×polity 0.00227 0.00159 0.00204 -0.000582
(0.000603) (0.000456) (0.000593) (0.000445)
polity -0.0898 -0.0589 -0.0874 0.0139
(0.0242) (0.0183) (0.0237) (0.0201)
ln(gni) 0.993 0.662 0.865 -0.290
(0.111) (0.0838) (0.109) (0.0731)
ln(population) -0.458 -0.358 0.0436 0.728
(0.322) (0.255) (0.336) (0.258)
ln(l) 0.344
(0.0917)
ln(k) 0.119
(0.0403)
hostility=1 -0.137 -0.0849 -0.145 0.00449
(0.104) (0.0798) (0.101) (0.0630)
hostility=2 0.221 0.0595 0.0151 -0.303
(0.0843) (0.0555) (0.0741) (0.104)
hostility=3 0.0777 0.0585 0.0693 -0.0206
(0.0843) (0.0615) (0.0762) (0.0496)
hostility=4 0.105 0.0834 0.0737 -0.0548
(0.0856) (0.0630) (0.0783) (0.0482)
hostility=5 -0.0465 -0.0687 0.0157 0.0892
(0.139) (0.120) (0.139) (0.103)
Country FE X X X X
Observations 479 479 479 479
R2 0.890 0.851 0.969 0.981
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 4.4: Ordinary least squares regressions on the imputed data using different dependent
variables. k and l are measures of military expenditure and military personnel. κ and κ˜
are the raw and normalized versions of ln(k/l).
Model 4.9 4.10 4.11 4.12
Variables κ κ˜ ln(k) ln(l)
Gini 0.00401 0.00120 0.00259 -0.00300
(0.00333) (0.00326) (0.00324) (0.00229)
Gini×polity 0.00106 0.000860 0.00105 -0.000254
(0.000200) (0.000195) (0.000192) (0.000120)
polity -0.0499 -0.0329 -0.0638 -0.00938
(0.00890) (0.00857) (0.00862) (0.00533)
ln(gni) 0.805 0.528 0.811 -0.173
(0.0179) (0.0158) (0.0167) (0.0159)
ln(population) -0.220 -0.0472 0.374 0.933
(0.0691) (0.0599) (0.0713) (0.0384)
ln(l) 0.479
(0.0235)
ln(k) 0.226
(0.0141)
hostility=1 0.00562 0.00279 0.0175 0.0164
(0.0389) (0.0328) (0.0369) (0.0213)
hostility=2 0.228 0.101 0.168 -0.141
(0.104) (0.0811) (0.0935) (0.0593)
hostility=3 0.0640 0.0307 0.0676 -0.00918
(0.0323) (0.0260) (0.0309) (0.0200)
hostility=4 0.141 0.0887 0.157 -0.00915
(0.0270) (0.0240) (0.0251) (0.0167)
hostility=5 0.266 0.157 0.358 0.0756
(0.0489) (0.0410) (0.0465) (0.0334)
Country FE X X X X
Observations 5,213 5,275 5,213 5,213
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Figure 4.4: Marginal effect of Gini on log(military expenditure/military personnel) for
different values of the Polity score. The top graph is produced by analysing the original data
with listwise deletion and the bottom graph is produced by analyzing data after multiple
imputations. The shodows show one-tailed and two-tailed statistical significance at 5%.
level.
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Figure 4.5: Numerical example showing changes of expenditure as Gini changes in Model
4.5. The solid and the dashed lines are the expected values of military expenditure for
a democratic and an authoritarian state, respectively. Shaded areas show 95% confidence
intervals. For Gini=0.35, the difference between the lower limit of the confidence interval
for the democratic state and the upper limit of the autocratic state is 47 million dollars.
estimated marginal effect of Gini on κ, because κ is the logarithm of a ratio. To
see the actual impact of a change in the independent variables, let us calculate the
associated effects for a numerical example. Suppose there is a democratic and a non-
democratic state (polity of +10 and −10) with similar characteristics and suppose
they both have a Gini coefficient of 0.25 (income distribution like Denmark) and they
each have an army of 1 million soldiers and each spend 1 billion dollars for their
military. How would their expenditure change if their Gini coefficient rose to 0.40
(income distribution like the United States)? Figure 4.5 illustrates the change in
military expenditure assuming that military personnel is held constant. It is clear
that for high and low values of polity, small changes in Gini are associated with
very large expected changes in the makeup of the armed forces.
Overall, we see that the null hypothesis of no correlation between income inequal-
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ity and how much capital and labor is allocated to armed forces is rejected. This
improves the credibility of the theoretical predictions of the model, but there are
two shortcomings here that should be taken into account in order not to overread
the results. First is the gap between the exact theoretical prediction and the model,
where, for data availability reasons, I replaced capital and labor allocated to a war
with national level military expenditure and personnel. Second, the reported results
clearly do not warrant any causal interpretation.20
4.6 Conclusion
I have presented a model of how states supply their militaries to fight asymmetric
wars. The critical innovation of the model was that the players, instead of the usual
guns-vs-butter trade-off, face a two-dimensional trade-off: how many soldiers should
be recruited (labor) and how much money (capital) should be spent for war. I showed
that both democracies and non-democracies become weaker as sensitivity to casual-
ties rises. As the outcome of a war depends more on labor and less on capital, all
capital-intensive militaries become less powerful, but democracies are more strongly
affected; whereas democracies enjoy an advantage compared to non-democracies in
fighting wars using conventional strategies, they lose their advantage when they face
insurgencies (which require more labor). Interestingly, this result is obtained even
when they know exactly what type of adversary they face. It was also predicted that
income inequality makes democracies rely more on capital and non-democracies rely
more on labor. I have also taken a step in testing the predictions of the model. The
predictions regarding democratic advantage and military recruitment and spending
were tested using Correlates of War and World Bank data and were borne out by the
empirical evidence.
20. In fact, a somewhat similar correlation has been interpreted in the opposite causal direction
before: Ali (2007) finds a positive correlation between military expenditure and inequal pay and
suggests that increasing military spending increases pay inequality.
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Appendix IV.A Who Wants More Troops?
A key assumption of the model presented in this chapter is that economic status
affects how costs of war are distributed. As a result, one’s economic status affects
one’s view about how the army is best equipped: poorer citizens support more capital
intensive armies and richer citizens support the opposite. Here, I will rely on a
panel study conducted by the American National Election Study in 2008-2009 where
respondents were asked whether or not they supported an increase in the number of
American troops fighting in Iraq.21 This study is particularly suitable for our analysis
because it has good timing: whereas the early phase of the Iraq war was not necessarily
an asymmetric war—as it was perceived to be a necessary “preventive war” by a
majority of the American electorate—the latter half of the war can be characterized
as an asymmetric war.
Five rounds of the ANES panel study have asked respondents about their position
on whether U.S. troops in Iraq should be decreased or increased.22 I use these to
construct the dependent variables for this study, troops, which show participants’
support for increase or decrease of troops fighting in Iraq and range from 1 (decrease
a lot) to 8 (increase a lot). I define troops as the average of all recorded responses
for each participant.23 The explanatory variable of interest here is income, which is
self-reported income by respondents. It is measured based on income bracket and is
an ordinal variable ranging from 1 to 19.
Figure 4.6 shows the results of semi-parametric linear regressions of the dependent
variable on income (Ruppert, Wand, and Carroll 2003).24 The dependent variable in
21. DeBell, Krosnick, and Lupia 2010.
22. The question was asked in a branching Likert scale. The exact wording of the question is:
“Compared to the number of U.S. troops in Iraq now, should the number of troops in Iraq three
months from now be more, less or about the same?”
23. Different participants were asked the question of troop increase in different rounds, so we have
more observations for troops than for single observations of troops.
24. I have used the spm function from the SemiPar package in R. This package accompanies the
Ruppert, Wand, and Carroll’s book.
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Figure 4.6: Support for increase in troop levels in Iraq as a function of respondents’ income
category. Results are obtained by semiparamteric regression.
the bottom-right panel is troops. It appears that income is positively correlated
with a support for increase in the number of troops, although this is weaker in some
surveys than others.
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 reflect more extensive evidence in support of the correlation
between income and support for increase in the number of troops by controlling for
a range of other explanatory variables. The basic equation used is the following:
troops = β1income+ βX + .
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Table 4.5: Ordinal logit regressions show that an increase in respondents’ income levels
is associated with an increase in their support for deployment of more troops in Iraq. The
dependent variable ranges from 1 to 8, and it was asked in February 2008.
Dep. Var: Troops (Feb 2008)
Variables / Model 4.13 4.14 4.15 4.16
income 0.0407 0.0322 0.0272
(0.0129) (0.0133) (0.0146)
T (income) 0.0719
(0.0275)
ideology -0.451 -0.153 -0.142 -0.143
(0.0331) (0.0441) (0.0442) (0.0442)
party 0.143 0.144 0.141
(0.0379) (0.0379) (0.0378)
IraqInvasion 1.413 1.415 1.414
(0.157) (0.158) (0.158)
education -0.0182 -0.0268
(0.0538) (0.0527)
female -0.499 -0.504
(0.107) (0.107)
Observations 1,256 1,256 1,256 1,256
Log likelihood -1974.7 -1894.4 -1883.5 -1881.8
Standard errors reported in parentheses.
Ordinal logit cutoff points are omitted from the table.
X represents other explanatory variables, and our expectation is that β1 should be
positive. First, this estimation is performed using ordinal logistic regressions and
taking troops from the second round of the panel study (February 2008) as the
dependent variable; the results are reported in Table 4.5. Then the same analysis
is performed using ordinary least squares regression and troops as the dependent
variable; the results are reported in Table 4.6.
Other explanatory variables used are defined as follows. ideology is the average
of all available measurements of ideology for the respondent, and ranges from 1 (very
liberal) to 7 (very conservative). party is the average of all available measurements of
partisanship for the respondent and ranges from 0 (strongly favoring the Republican
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Table 4.6: Ordinary least squares results showing support for increase in troops (averaged
for each respondent) is positively correlated with income.
Dep. Var: Troops (average)
Variables / Model 4.17 4.18 4.19 4.20
income 0.0162 0.00688 0.00427
(0.00587) (0.00571) (0.00605)
T (income) 0.0219
(0.0112)
ideology -0.281 -0.0907 -0.0859 -0.0868
(0.0128) (0.0172) (0.0171) (0.0171)
party 0.1000 0.0975 0.0950
(0.0159) (0.0158) (0.0158)
IraqInvasion 0.828 0.835 0.835
(0.0638) (0.0639) (0.0639)
education 0.00338 -0.00499
(0.0221) (0.0219)
female -0.188 -0.187
(0.0433) (0.0431)
constant 4.291 2.162 2.274 2.201
(0.0938) (0.139) (0.154) (0.157)
Observations 2,585 2,584 2,584 2,584
R2 0.146 0.260 0.266 0.267
Robust standard errors in parentheses
party) to 6 (strongly favoring the Democratic party). education, similarly, is ordinal
and ranges from 1 to 5. female is a dichotomous variable, taking 1 if the respondent
is a female and 0 otherwise. Finally, IraqInvasion is how strongly the respondent
thinks the United States should have invaded Iraq in 2003 and ranges from 1 to 2.
This is obtained by averaging over all dichotomous responses in answer to the question
of whether “the United States should or should not have sent troops to fight the war
in Iraq in 2003?”
As mentioned above, income only shows the income bracket, hence there is no
reason to include it in our model in a linear way. Figure 4.6 suggest a flattened tilde
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(/−/) shape. In Models 4.4 and 4.8, I use T (income), where T is defined as
T (x) =

x; x < 20
3
20
3
; 20
3
≤ x ≤ 40
3
x− 40
3
; x ≥ 20
3
Using T (income) provides a slightly better fit, satisfying conventional thresholds of
statistical significance in models that include all explanatory variables.
Both sets of results support the idea that higher income is associated with stronger
support for more troops. To provide exact numbers, it is easier to consult Figure 4.6
or Table 4.6. Overall, we can see that going from the bottom category to the top
category is on average associated with roughly one quarter of one category increase
in troops. For example, Model 4.17 shows 0.0162 × (19 − 1) = 0.292 unit change
and model Model 4.20 shows 0.0219 × (19 − 20/3 − 1) = 0.2482 unit change when
everything is held constant and income goes from 1 to 19.
108
CHAPTER V
Conclusion
Asymmetric wars comprise the majority of military engagements of developed
countries. These wars are subject to the vicissitudes of domestic politics. “Success
for the insurgents [arises] not from a military victory on the ground—though military
successes may [be] a contributory cause—but rather from the progressive attrition of
their opponents’ political capability to wage war” (Mack 1975).
The goal of this dissertation has been to provide parsimonious theories that al-
low us to answer two important questions: How long does the strong side continue
fighting? And how does the strong side fight the war?
In Chapter II, I predicted that public support for asymmetric wars diminishes
as time passes. This prediction does not rely on any assumption of irrationality of
citizens. It also shows that while much attention, both in the academic literature and
in policy circles, has been given to various manifestation of costs, duration of a war
is equally, if not more, important in shaping public support for the war. Moreover, it
is predicted that states that are more democratic fight shorter asymmetric wars.
Chapter III put these predictions to test. At the micro levels, a survey experiment
on two samples (one of them a nationally representative sample of the American
electorate) corroborated the prediction that in asymmetric wars, duration of a war
may be a more detrimental factor than total casualties suffered in that war. At the
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macro level, analyzing duration of counter-insurgency wars showed that democracies
and non-democracies are not significantly different from each other when they fight
domestic counter-insurgencies, but democracies fight shorter counter-insurgency wars
when they fight in foreign lands. This is in line with the theoretical prediction that
democracies fight shorter wars only when the stakes are low.
Chapter IV provided an explanation for the poor performance of developed states,
especially democracies, in asymmetric wars. This was the result of a two-tax model
of war supply, which distinguished between the human cost (labor) and the monetary
cost (capital) of fighting a war. In equilibrium, we see an overreliance on capital,
which produces unfavorable outcomes in missions where soldiers are needed more than
machines. Critically, this overreliance does not require an assumption of irrationality
of the players or assuming that they do not know what type of war they face; it is
produced because of the way the costs of war are distributed. It is predicted that
the gap between the likelihood of victory in conventional and asymmetric wars is
greater for democracies than for non-democracies. The model also yields a number of
other comparative static predictions. In particular, it is predicted that greater levels
of income inequality should result in more capital-intensive militaries in democratic
states, and, in less capital-intensive militaries in nondemocratic states. Empirical
tests based on the Correlates of War data and World Bank’s World Development
Indicators supported the theory.
Reiter and Stam (2002) called democracies’ apparent upper hand in winning con-
ventional wars “democracy’s fourth virtue.” That optimism vanishes when we look
at asymmetric wars. Different pieces of this work together provide a pessimistic view
of democratic states’ capabilities to wage successful asymmetric wars and continue
fighting until they reach victory. This is, however, not to say that democracies—or
powerful states—lose most of the asymmetric wars they fight. But it does emphasize
two of their major shortcomings when fighting asymmetric wars. Moreover, there is
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no simple solution for the shortcomings of democratic states when they fight wars
that are not deemed worthy of much human sacrifice by their electorate.
One of the caveats of the research in this dissertation is that the two questions
of ‘how the strong side fights’ and ‘how long the strong side fights’ are addressed
separately. Chapters II and III assumed that the effort level, and hence costs, as
well as the probability of victory, were fixed throughout the war, while Chapter IV
modeled war as a single stage lottery but the war effort was chosen by the strong
side. An important avenue for future investigation is combining the two models and
studying the robustness of these results.
Finally, it deserve emphasis that the results of this work are only valid insofar as
the assumptions hold. For any policy lesson to be drawn from the present work, we
have to also assess what is absent from the models. The most important elements
absent from my models are long term strategic calculations. A natural conclusion
to the limits in fighting asymmetric wars that are enumerated here may be that
strong states ought to either get others to fight their wars (proxy wars), or fight
remotely, with drones and missiles but without soldiers on the ground. This way,
the human cost is so low that the electorate would not notice the war and the war
can in theory continue in perpetuity. But, even if we ignore the real human cost to
both sides and assume that these engagements provide actual tactical benefit, the
blowback from these wars and the long term hostilities that they may foment must
be taken into account before one rushes to prescribe proxy wars or joystick wars as
ideal ways to circumvent the limiting forces of democratic politics. Vivid reminders
of these long term strategic miscalculations abound. The attacks of September 11,
2012 in Benghazi, Libya, or the attacks of September 11, 2001 in New York suffice as
examples of when these remedies go astray. The case of Libya was in the aftermath of
a ‘successful’ remote war, and the case of New York was, in part, the result of years
of support for rogue groups which fought a proxy war in Afghanistan.
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